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L INTRODUCTION

During the past decade, two Justices of the Supreme Court have
explicitly announced that they would refuse to apply established Supreme
Court precedent regarding capital punishment. Although they differed from
one another on important matters, they both premised their decisions on
their mutual contention that two lines of Court authority are irreconcilable.
The first of these lines of authority has its roots in Furmanv. Georgia'and
mandates guided discretion in capital sentencing. The second line of
authority has roots in Woodson v. North Carolina2 and requires
individualized assessment of each offender and offense in capital
sentencing.
Justice Scalia contends in Walton v. Arizona3 that these two lines of
authority are irreconcilable, and he repudiates the requirement of
individualized assessment.4 He justifies this decision by reasoning that the
guided discretion doctrine reflects an arguable basis in constitutional text
and history, but the individualized assessment line of authority lacks such
a foundation. 5 Justice Blackmun, in contrast, contends in Callins v.
Collins6 that both lines of authority are necessary to constitutional
application of capital punishment but that the two are irreconcilable.7 He
concludes, therefore, that constitutional administration of capital
punishment is impossible.8
Other Justices have refrained from drawing the conclusion that these
lines of authority are irreconcilable, but they have explicitly recognized a
tension between them. These Justices address this tension in the Court's
capital punishment doctrine as they would approach similar difficulties
created by the need to administer other areas of law in a manner that
satisfies competing principles or policies. They interpret precedent and
decide cases in a manner that seeks to balance concern for both lines of
precedent.9 Some commentators contend that these attempts to

1. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972); see also discussion infra PartHl.A.
2. 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
3. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
4. Id. at 656-57, 664; see also discussion infraPart B.C.
5. Walton, 497 U.S. at 670-71.
6. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
7. Id at 1144-45; see also discussion infra Part B.C.
8. Calins,510 U.S. at 1145.
9. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-73 (1994) (Kennedy, J.); Romano v.
Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1994) (Rehnquist, CJ.); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,484-92
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988) (White, I.,

plurality opinion); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
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accommodate both lines of precedent have generated an illusory body of
doctrine in which apparently complex doctrinal constraints on capital
sentencing
mask essentially unrestricted discretion for sentencers in capital
10
cases.
This series of developments is particularly perplexing because the two
lines of authority in question apparently pursue two purposes ordinarily
understood as central to fairness in the application of any punishment.
Stated intuitively, the opinions requiring individualized assessment call for
careful consideration of the evidence relevant to selecting the most
justifiable punishment for a particular offender and offense, and the
opinions requiring guided discretion call for consistent application of the
criteria ofcapital punishment such that relevantly similar offenders receive
comparable punishment for comparable offenses. At first glance, these two
requirements appear compatible and foundational to fairness in capital
sentencing specifically, and in criminal sentencing more generally.
In this Article, I examine the putative contradiction or tension between
these two lines of Supreme Court authority. This analysis clarifies the
reasoning in the opinions that generate these doctrines and identifies the
penal purposes, formal principles of justice, and conceptual ambiguities
that generate this controversy. I argue that these lines of precedent are
compatible in principle and that the putative contradiction between them
results from the failure to fully articulate these requirements and their
functions in satisfying the formal principles of justice as applied to
punishment. This explanation also reveals fundamental defects in
contemporary capital punishment doctrine and practice, however, in that
the apparent contradiction between these two lines of precedent masks the
need to address underlying questions regarding the substantivejustification
of capital punishment and the proper roles of formal and informal
community standards in the administration of capital punishment in legal
institutions representing liberal principles of political morality.
Contemporary debates regarding capital punishment address at least
three distinct but related sets of concerns. The first addresses the moral
justification of capital punishment. It involves a dispute regarding which,
if any, defensible moral principles justify an institution of capital
punishment or the application of that institution to specific individuals for
specific offenses.' The second addresses legal doctrine. This debate

also discussion infraPart II.C.
10. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradoxof Today's
Arbitraryand Mandatory CapitalPunishmentScheme, 6WM. &MARY BIlLRTS. J. 345,360-91
(1998); Carol S. Steiker&JordanM. Steiker, SoberSecond Thoughts:Reflectionson Two Decades
of ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 357,371-403 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Louis P. POJMAN&JEFFREYREIMAN, THE DEATHPENALTY: FORANDAGAINST
(1998); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENATY: A DEBATE (1983).
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concerns the best interpretation and justification oflegal doctrine regarding
capital punishment. It is particularly concerned with questions regarding
the coherence of this doctrine and its consistency with broader principles
embedded in the legal system, including the relevant constitutional
provisions. This second level of analysis resembles the first in that it
appeals to principles of political morality, but it differs from the first in that
it represents an appeal to the principles represented by the legal institutions
of a particular society. These principles provide a systemic justification in
that they justify rules or practices as consistent with the broader legal
system. The first level of analysis, in contrast, represents a critical moral
analysis by appeal to defensible moral principles." The third set of
concerns dominating contemporary debate addresses practical
considerations raised by capital punishment as applied. The third set
includes, for example, the ability of jurors to comprehend and apply jury
instructions, the effectiveness of instructions or procedures designed to
reduce discriminatory application, and the degree of pain or terror caused
by various means of execution. 3
These three types of debate interact. The significance of practical
considerations, for example, depends partially on the systemic and critical
justifications of capital punishment. Similarly, the practical significance of
the moral justifications depends partially on our ability to construct and
apply practices that conform to those justifications. A comprehensive
justification of capital punishment must demonstrate that it is: (1)
systemically justified by principles embodied in the legal institutions, (2)
criticallyjustified by defensible moral principles, and (3) applied through
practices that conform to these justifications.
This Article does not purport to resolve the dispute regarding the moral
justification of capital punishment. Rather, I directly address concerns of
the second type. I set aside questions regarding the justification of capital
punishment in principle and those that address practical considerations,
such as juror comprehension of instructions. This Article examines the
putative contradiction or tension that arises between two components of
Supreme Court doctrine, and it addresses that issue in the context of the
relationship between an institution of capital punishment and the principles
of political morality represented by the legal institutions of a liberal
society. The analysis supports the following theses. First, these two lines
of Supreme Court authority are compatible in principle. Second,
interpretation of these two lines of authority requires clarification of three
central ambiguities in the opinions. Third, clarification of the two lines of
12. JOEL PEiNBEGR, HARMLES WRONGDOING 124-26 (1988) (distinguishing between
conventional and critical morality).
13. See, e.g., MARKCOTANzo, JuST REVENGE 33-37 (jury instructions), 42-47 (methods of
execution), 79-84 (discrimination in application) (1997).
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authority and of these ambiguities requires interpretation in context of
comparative and noncomparativejustice as principles of political morality
embedded in the legal institutions of a liberal society. Fourth, these
principles partially define limits on the institutional structures through
which capital sentencing decisions are made. Fifth, the analysis that
demonstrates the compatibility of these two lines of authority raises serious
questions about the adequacy of the current practices of capital sentencing.
Perhaps most importantly, however, this analysis demonstrates that
differentiating the three levels of analysis and examining the relationships
among them can clarify some aspects of the ongoing debate. Although, this
Article directly addresses the second level of analysis, a fully satisfactory
approach must ultimately integrate the three levels of analysis.
Part II summarizes and clarifies some central components of
contemporary Supreme Court doctrine. Part III provides a brief exposition
of the principles of comparative and noncomparative justice, and Part IV
interprets the doctrines discussed in Part II as applications of the principles
discussed in Part IlL Part V identifies three central ambiguities that lie at
the core of the apparent contradiction or tension created by the Court's
capital punishment doctrine. Part VI advances an integrated interpretation
of these three ambiguities that produces coherence in the doctrine as well
as consistency between the doctrine and the underlying principles of
comparative and noncomparative justice. Part VII identifies a distinct
source of tension between capital sentencing practice and the integrated
body of doctrine, and Part VIII discusses one potential alternative
sentencing structure designed to address this source of tension. Part IX
concludes the paper with a discussion of the relationships among these
levels of analysis in the ongoing debate regarding capital punishment.
I. CENTRAL SUPRBME COURT DOCrIUNE

A. GuidedDiscretion
Some judicial opinions and commentary discuss a contradiction or
tension between the two lines of Supreme Court authority that establish the
requirements of guided discretion and individualized assessment in the
administration of capital punishment. The principle of guided discretion
has its roots in the concurring opinions in Funnan.14 Although this case
provides a critical component in the foundation of modern Supreme Court
capital punishment doctrine, a precise interpretation ofits significance and
limits remains elusive because the Justices who formed the majority for the
judgment provided five different concurring opinions.

14. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,240-371 (1972).
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Two Justices contended that capital punishment generally violates the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. These two Justices included the
potential for arbitrary and discriminatory application among the grounds
they advanced for this conclusion. 5 Three other Justices concurred in the
judgment overturning the sentences in the cases at issue on narrower
grounds involving arbitrary or discriminatory application or the potential
for such application under the discretionary provisions in force at that
time.16 Thus, only the narrower conclusion regarding arbitrary or
discriminatory application of capital punishment under discretionary
provisions elicited majority support.
The potential for arbitrary or discriminatory application arose at least
partially because the statutes under which these capital sentences had been
administered allowed unbounded sentencer discretion in the capital
sentencing decision. These jurisdictions authorized capital punishment for
a variety of offenses committed by a large number of offenders, but
relatively few offenders were actually sentenced to death and executed.
Furthermore, the statutes provided the sentencers with little or no guidance
regarding the bases on which they should select some offenders for capital
punishment and others for lesser sentences. In short, many convicted
offenders were eligible for capital punishment but few were selected, and
the capital sentencing provisions provided little or no guidance regarding
that selection process.
Several Justices concluded that these provisions produced arbitrary or
discriminatory patterns of sentencing. At least two Justices emphasized the
arbitrary nature of sentencing under these provisions, citing an apparent
lack of any consistent or defensible bases for the selection of some
convicted offenders for capital punishment and others for less severe
sentences.'8 Other Justices emphasized discriminatory sentencing on the
basis of illegitimate factors, including race and poverty. In summary, the
five Justices who concurred in the judgments that overturned the capital
sentences at issue differed significantly regarding the scope of their
conclusions and regarding their rationales for those conclusions. The
relatively narrow reasoning on which all five Justices converged addressed
the lack of guidance that authorized sentencers to exercise unguided
discretion in a manner generating arbitrary or discriminatory sentences or
the potential for such sentences.

15. Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314-73 (Marshall, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 31014 (White, I., concurring).
17. Id. at 291-300 (Brennan, ., concurring); id. at 253 (Douglas, L, concurring); id. at 31114 (White, 3., concurring).

18. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, 3., concurring); id. at 311-14 (White, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, ., concurring).
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Following Furman,a number of states revised their capital sentencing
provisions, generating a series of cases decided by the Court in 1976. The
Court reviewed several of these revised capital punishment provisions,
upholding some as satisfactorily addressing the concerns raised in Furman
and overturning others as failing to satisfy these concerns. Although the
opinions do not provide clear rules or guidelines for states that adopt and
apply capital punishment statutes, they contain a few general lines of
thought reflecting the Justices' interpretations of the principles revealed in
Furman.These principles require guided discretion of sentencing decisions
in a manner that renders them consistent with evolving societal standards,
legitimate penal purposes, the circumstances of the offenses, and the
characters of the offenders. 2
These decisions approved provisions that employed some statutory
device that narrows the class of offenders eligible for capital punishment.
These provisions establish necessary but not sufficient conditions for the
application of capital punishment to particular offenders. They exclude
some offenders as ineligible for capital punishment and identify others as
eligible for further consideration during which some of those identified as
eligible may be selected for capital punishment. Some statutes narrow the
class of capital defendants by defining a fixed and relatively limited set of
capital offenses, generally limited to a certain subset of homicides and
perhaps a few additional offenses. 21 Other statutes narrow the class of
capital offenders by requiring that the sentencer find an enumerated
aggravating factor in order to render eligible for capital punishment a
particular offender who has committed one of the offenses for which
capital punishment is available. Under these provisions, capital punishment
eligibility requires two successive filters. First the trial court must convict
the defendant of a capital crime, and then the sentencer must find an
enumerated aggravating factor.' By narrowing the definition of capital
crimes or by requiring an enumerated aggravating factor, these procedures
identify a relatively narrow set of offenders as eligible for further
consideration during which they may be selected for capital punishment.
Although the term "narrowing" might be read to suggest that these
provisions merely reduce the number of offenders eligible for capital
punishment, a more plausible reading reveals ajustificatory function. The
Court approved these provisions at least partially because they addressed

20. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,189,206-07 (1976) (Stewart, L, plurality opinion);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,288-97,303-04 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-63 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
268 (1976) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). The Court may have limited capital punishment to
homicide in Cokerv. Georgia,433 U.S. 584,591-600 (1977).
22. Gregg,428 U.S. at 164-66,196-98 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242,247-60 (1976) (Powell, ., plurality opinion).
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the problem of arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing under previous
statutes. Arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing involves similarities or
differences among sentences that do not reflect legitimate sentencing
considerations. The plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia2 explained the
importance of administering capital punishment in a manner that serves
legitimate penal purposes and avoids the gratuitous infliction of suffering.'
Statutes that narrow the set of death-eligible offenders by selecting only
those who qualify as more culpable, more likely to recidivate, or more
appropriate for capital punishment according to some other legitimate
systemic criterion serve to reduce the number of death-eligible offenders
in a manner that justifies the more severe punishment of those selected. 25
The Court further narrowed the class of offenders eligible for capital
punishment by excluding certain offenses from those that may carry a
penalty of death. The Court rejected capital punishment as disproportionate
for those convicted of only the rape of an adult woman. The plurality
opinion remains somewhat ambiguous in that some passages suggest a
narrow reading that addresses only rape of an adult woman but others
suggest that the plurality considers capital punishment excessive for any
crime that does not involve homicide. 6 Read narrowly, the opinion
establishes at least that the states do not have discretion to define capital
crimes as broadly as they choose and that rape of an adult woman falls
beyond the limits of this discretion.
Although the plurality opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma2 suggests
that offenders who are below the age of sixteen when they commit capital
crimes are not eligible for capital punishment, the concurring opinion
rejects this categorical narrowing rule.' Thus, the case provides a majority
for the judgment overturning the specific sentence at issue, but it does not
provide a categorical narrowing rule that precludes capital punishment for
those who commit capital crimes before they reach the age of sixteen.
Similarly, the Court has refrained from establishing a categorical rule
precluding capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders.29 Thus, the
Court has applied this categorical approach to narrowing in a very limited
manner to date.30

23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. Id. at 182-87 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
25. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,877 (1983).
26. Coker,433 U.S. at 592-98 (rape of adult woman); id. at 597-600 (non-homicide) (White,
J., plurality opinion). For a recent discussion by a state supreme court of the state statute applying
capital punishment for aggravated rape of a child, see State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1067-68
(La. 1996).
27. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
28. Id. at 838 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id.at 848-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,337-39 (1989).
30. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 373-79.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss3/2

8

Schopp: Reconciling "Irreconcilable" Capital Punishment Doctrine as Compa
200 11

RECONCIUNG IRRECONCLABLE CAITAL PUNISHMENFTDOCrRINE

While the narrowing function limits the categories of offenses and
offenders eligible for capital punishment, the channeling function guides
and limits sentencer discretion in selecting some offenders for capital
punishment from among the eligible set. The Texas statute reviewed in
Jurek v. Texas,3 for example, narrowed the set of offenders who were
eligible for capital punishment by defining five specific conditions under
which conviction for murder rendered the offender eligible for capital
punishment.32 It then selected certain offenders for capital punishment
from among this eligible set by addressing three questions to the
sentencer.33 Other statutes guide the selection of certain offenders for
capital punishment from the set of death-eligible offenders by listing
aggravating and mitigating factors and instructing sentencers that they are
to select those appropriate for capital punishment by evaluating offenders
according to these factors and perhaps in light of other relevant factors.34
Although the Court's opinions in the 1976 cases emphasized narrowing
and channeling, a later opinion suggests that a sentencing statute that
provides satisfactory narrowing of the death-eligible category can dispense
with channeling35in selection, allowing the sentencer unbounded discretion
in that process.
In addition to providing sentencers with such narrowing and channeling
mechanisms, capital sentencing provisions provide for mandatory review
by state appellate courts. These reviews seek to promote consistent
application of capital punishment by overturning sentences that are
disproportionate or that reveal a pattern of arbitrary or discriminatory
sentencing in the context of the state's broader set of capital cases.36 Thus,
these statutes combine various approaches to narrowing, channeling, and
appellate review in order to avoid or ameliorate the defects in capital
sentencing forbidden in Furman. Through these practices, they seek to
render the state's sentencing practices consistent with defensible social
values and legitimate penal purposes.

31. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
32. Id. at 268-69 (Stevens, L, plurality opinion).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164-65, 196-98 (1976) (Stewart, ., plurality
opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 246-58 (1976) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
35. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,874-80 (1983); Steiker & Steiker, supranote 10, at
379-81.
36. Gregg,428 U.S. at 167,198-207 (Stewart, J., pluralityopinion); Proffit, 428 U.S. at25052, 259-60 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
FLOPIDA L4WREV7EW

VoL 53

B. IndividualizedAssessment
The 1976 opinions provided the foundation for a series of Supreme
Court cases requiring individualized assessment of offenders who are
eligible for capital punishment. These cases establish the principle that the
conception of human dignity protected by the Eighth Amendment requires
that sentencers consider all evidence regarding the circumstances of the
offense and the character of the offender in order to sentence each
individual in a manner consistent with the legitimate penal purposes of
capital punishment." These opinions discuss deterrence and retribution as
the primary legitimate purposes of capital punishment, emphasizing the
individualized assessment of the offender's culpability as central to the
selection of the proper punishment for a specific offender and offense."5
The Court rejected mandatory approaches to capital sentencing as
precluding individualized assessment and therefore as failing to sentence
each offender in a manner appropriate to his culpability for his offense.39
The Court also rejected mandatory capital sentencing as inconsistent with
societal values and as failing to fulfill the requirement of guided
discretion. ' The Court upheld approaches to capital punishment that
provide for case-by-case assessment of each offender and offense in light
of the legitimate purposes of deterrence and retribution. The Court upheld
the Texas system partially because it interpreted the special questions
addressing dangerousness and deliberateness as allowing individualized
assessment of the factors relevant to deterrence and retribution manifested
by the specific offender and offense.41 The Court upheld statutes listing
aggravating and mitigating factors partially because these factors provide
the sentencer with the opportunity to consider the characteristics of the
offender and the offense that are relevant to the identified penal purposes
of capital punishment. 42 These and later cases made it clear that this
function requires that the trial court must admit and the sentencer must
consider all mitigating evidence. 43
Unfortunately, the Court has not been entirely clear regarding the
relationship between the requirements of guided discretion and individual

37. Gregg,428 U.S. at 182-87 (Stewart, 3., plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280,303-05 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
38. Gregg,428 U.S. at 183-87 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05.
39. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 288 (societal values) (Stewart, ., plurality opinion); id. at 302-03 (guided
discretion) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
41. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,272-76 (1976) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
42. Gregg,428 U.S. at 182-98 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242,251-52 (1976) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
43. Eddings v. Oklahoma,455 U.S. 104,110-15 (1982); Lockettv. Ohio,438 U.S. 586,60408 (1978); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 (Stewart, ., plurality opinion).
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assessment. This relationship appears amenable to at least two distinctly
different interpretations. First, individualized assessment may represent a
component of the channeling function of guided discretion in that it can be
understood as requiring that the sentencer fully evaluate the offender and
the offense according to the criteria of culpability that the Court often
emphasizes as grounds for selecting those who are appropriate subjects of
capital punishment. Second, individualized assessment may represent an
independent requirement of capital sentencing that limits the manner in
which the state may direct the sentencer's decision. According to this
interpretation, individualized assessment requires that the trial court admit
and the sentencer consider any evidence the offender offers as mitigating.
This interpretation precludes sentencing provisions that limit the range of
evidence the offender can admit or that constrain the manner in which the
sentencer attributes mitigating effect. If one adopts the latter interpretation,
one must address concerns regarding compatibility between the
individualized assessment and guided discretion requirements and
regarding the proper manner in which to address potential conflicts
between them. Some later opinions and some commentators adopt this
latter interpretation and discuss a contradiction or tension arising between
the requirements of guided discretion and individualized assessment.
C. The Contradictionor Tension
Somejudicial opinions explicitly recognize a tension between these two
components of Supreme Court doctrine, and others claim that the two
constitute irreconcilable lines of authority. Consider first those who
interpret the two lines of authority as irreconcilable. Justice Scalia
contends that these components of doctrine generate a contradiction such
that no statute or sentencer can satisfy both.44 He interprets the guided
discretion and individualized assessment doctrines as requiring sentencer
discretion that is both limited and unlimited.45 He interprets a series of
cases beginning with Furmanas requiring guided discretion in the form of
clear, objective standards that prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
sentencing by limiting sentencing discretion and by rendering sentencer
decisions subject to appellate review. 4 He interprets the individualized
assessment cases as requiring unlimited defendant discretion to enter as
mitigating any evidence the defendant wishes and unbounded sentencer
discretion to give any mitigating effect to that evidence that the sentencer
47
chooses.

44. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-64 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 657-61 (Scalia, J., concurring).

47. Id. at 661-64 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Scalia understands these two requirements as irreconcilable and
contends that sentencers cannot have unbounded discretion to withhold
capital punishment for any reason or no reason and limited discretion to
sentence offenders to capital punishment. Sentencers do not make distinct
decisions regarding the imposition of capital punishment and the
withholding of capital punishment such that they can make the first with
limited discretion and the second with unbounded discretion. Rather they
make a single sentencing decision to either apply or withhold capital
punishment. Thus, they must make this single decision with limited
discretion that meets the guided discretion requirement or with unlimited
discretion mandated by the individualized assessment requirement.4 This
interpretation leads Scalia to conclude that it is impossible to apply both
lines of doctrine. He interprets the guided discretion line of authority as
reflecting arguable support in the Constitution because unbridled discretion
generates wanton or freakish application of capital sentences, implicating
the "unusual" provision of the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. He contends, in contrast, that the individualized assessment
line of authority lacks any constitutional basis. He therefore announces that
he will apply the guided discretion doctrine but that he will not attempt to
apply the individualized assessment doctrine.49
Justice Blackmun's position resembles that of Justice Scalia in that he
understands the two lines of doctrine as irreconcilable. Although he asserts
that the two requirements are compatible in principle, he contends that the
Court's experience since Furman demonstrates that attempts to develop
substantive rules and procedures that satisfy both requirements have failed
and resulted in arbitrary and discriminatory capital punishment. ° He
rejects the notion that the Court can address this conflict by limiting the
requirement of guided discretion to the eligibility determination and
allowing full discretion in selection because this approach merely reduces
the number of individuals subject to arbitrary sentencing.51 This assessment
leads Blackmun to a different conclusion than Scalia's, however, because
Blackmun understands both requirements as necessary to a constitutional
institution of capital punishment. If a constitutional institution of capital
punishment must satisfy both requirements and the two are irreconcilable,
then no institution of capital punishment can meet constitutional standards.
Blackmun therefore rejects capital punishment as impossible to implement
in a manner that satisfies constitutional requirements. 2

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 665-67 (Scalia, I., concurring).
Id. at 670-73 (Scalia, ., concurring).
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144-45 (1994) (Blackmun, 3., dissenting).
Id. at 1152-53 (Blackmnun, 3., dissenting).
Id. at 1155-57 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
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Other Justices recognize that the Court has had difficulty articulating
and applying these requirements and that the states have found it difficult
to craft and apply provisions that satisfy them. These Justices, however,
discuss these concerns as reflecting tension between the two doctrines
rather than as demonstrating that they are irreconcilable. They address this
tension as reflecting the difficulty that arises when legislatures and courts
must design and apply sentencing provisions intended to satisfy a complex
set of principles, policy considerations, and factual circumstances.53
Understood in this manner, the tension requires neither that the Court
selects one of two contradictory doctrines nor that the Court abandons the
project of administering capital punishment consistent with the
requirements of the Constitution. Rather, it requires that the Court interpret
and evaluate statutes and applications of those statutes in a manner that
best accommodates the underlying principles and purposes, recognizing
that this may require a complex balancing process.
Some commentators contend that the Court's attempts to reconcile the
requirements of guided discretion and individualized assessment have led
the Court to effectively abandon the channeling function independent of
narrowing. According to this interpretation, the Court's cases effectively
require that capital punishment statutes narrow the class of offenders
eligible for capital punishment but abandon the channeling function in the
selection process. In doing so, the Court has given sentencers full latitude
to consider all potential mitigating evidence for each individual offender
in the selection process, but it has done so at the cost of allowing unlimited
discretion in that process and, thus, of exacerbating the opportunity for
arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing that the Furmandecision repudiated.
These commentators contend that doctrinal complexity obscures the degree
to which apparently complex doctrinal requirements actually allow
completely unguided discretion leading to arbitrary or discriminatory
sentences. 5
The data suggesting sentencing discrimination by race of victim in
close cases appears consistent with this interpretation in that it may reveal
discriminatory variations in sentencing obscured by, and perhaps generated
by, the complex and confusing doctrine and the associated jury
instructions. 55 Insofar as discriminatory sentencing is the product of

53. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-73 (1994) (Kennedy, J.); Romano v.
Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1994) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (The Eighth Amendment requires two
"somewhat contradictory" inquiries before imposing the death penalty.); Johnson v. Texas, 509
U.S. 350, 360, 373 (1993) (Kennedy, J.); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 484-92 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Frankin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988) (White, J., plurality
opinion); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Kirchmeier, supra note 10, at 360-91; Steiker & Steiker, supranote 10, at 371-403.
55. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL. EQUAL JUsTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
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unintentional bias, it is reasonable to expect that it would manifest
primarily when the case is close by legitimate factors and legal guidance
is vague or ambiguous. These circumstances create vulnerability to the
influence of unarticulated impressions or intuitions, and unintentional bias
may shape these impressions. Thus, the complex body of Supreme Court
doctrine developed for the purpose of preventing arbitrary or
discriminatory sentencing may actively contribute to these concerns
because the complexity masks the degree to which the lack of clear or
precise limits renders decisionmaking vulnerable to unintended bias.

1I. COMPARATIE AND NONCOMPARATIVE JusTIcE
Justice Blackmun contends that the goals of individual fairness,
reasonable consistency, and absence of error appear mutually attainable on
their face, but he also contends that the Court has virtually conceded that
both fairness and rationality cannot be attained.5 6 As ordinarily understood,
fairness, consistency, and rationality seem not only compatible but
mutually reinforcing. Decisions or practices are fair when they are in
accord with applicable rules or standards,57 and they are rational when they
are "based on reason or reasoning."" Thus, consistent application of
standards that provide good reasons for decisions would produce decisions
that were fair, because they were in accord with the standards, and rational,
because those standards provide good reasons for the decisions. At first
glance, it seems puzzling that Justice Blackmun and the other members of
the Court would find incompatibility or tension among lines of authority
designed to achieve these apparently compatible goals of consistency,
fairness, and rationality in the application of capital punishment.
Justice requires that a person receive the treatment that he or she is due.
It is applied in comparative and noncomparative formulations.59 The
formal principle of noncomparative justice requires that each individual
receive treatment appropriate to that individual's merit or desert.
Application of that formal principle requires some substantive standards
ofjustice for a particular purpose. These substantive standards identify the
specific bases in rights or desert that serve as the criteria of justice for that
purpose.6" Retributive justice addresses the justification of punishment as
an institution and as application of that institution to particular offenders
for particular offenses. Retributive justice in this broad sense includes all
EMPIICALANALYSIS 149-60 (1990).
56. Callins,510 U.S. at 1144-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. THENEWSHORTEROXFORDENGUSHDCriONARY 907(4th ed. 1993).
58. Jd. at 2482.
59. THE CAMBRIDGE DICrIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 395 (2nd ed. 1999); see also JOEL
FEINBERG, RIGHTs, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LImERTY 265-306 (1980).
60. See FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 268.
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theories of the justification of punishment, including but not limited to
those thatjustify punishment by guilt, desert, or culpability. Theories of the
latter type are ordinarily understood as retributive theories of punishment
and are included within the broader field of retributive justice.61
For the purpose of retributive justice, noncomparative justice requires
that the individual offender receive the punishment appropriate to that
offender's merit as defined by the applicable criteria of justified
punishment. Legal punishment requires justification as an institution and
as an application of that institution.6' Specific applications of legal
punishment occur when a particular individual receives punishment for a
particular offense according to the standards of the institution. A systemic
justification of a specific instance of punishment would defend that
punishment as consistent with the systemic criteria of retributive justice
adopted within that criminal justice system. A systemic justification
provides a necessary but not sufficient condition for the comprehensive
justification of specific instances of punishment. Unjust systemic criteria
of punishment might produce instances of punishment that meet these
criteria but remain unjust. Thus, a satisfactory justification of a particular
instance of criminal punishment must justify that application of
punishment by systemic criteria, and it must justify these systemic criteria.
Systemic criteria of punishment are subject to evaluation by broader
systemic standards and by standards of critical morality.' A broader
systemic justification of the systemic criteria of punishment would justify
those criteria as consistent with the principles of political morality
underlying the comprehensive set of legal institutions of that society. A
critical justification for systemic criteria of justified punishment would
defend those criteria as morally justifiable according to defensible moral
principles. As applied to capital sentencing within a particular criminal
justice system, noncomparativejustice by systemic standards requires that
each individual offender receives capital punishment if and only if that
offender satisfies the criteria of capital punishment in that legal system.
The criteria of capital punishment applied by that institution remain subject
to systemic evaluation by the broader principles underlying the legal
system for that society and to critical moral evaluation. Thus, a
comprehensive noncomparativejustification for aparticular application of
capital punishment would involve three steps. The first would justify this

61. THE CAMBRIDGEDICIONARYOPPHLOSOPHY, supranote 59, at 395; see also FEINBERG,
supra note 59, at 267-68; Michael S. Moore, The MoralWorth ofRetribution,in RESPONSIBmxrY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEw ESSAYS INMORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179-85 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987).
62. H.LA. HART, PUNISHMENTANDRESPONSIBI.rY: ESSAYS INTHE PHILOSOPHY OFLAW 8-

13 (1968).
63. FEINBERG, supranote 12, at 124-26 (distinguishing critical and conventional morality).
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instance of capital punishment by systemic standards. The second would
justify those standards by the principles of political morality represented
by the broader legal system. The third would justify those standards by
defensible moral principles.
Comparative justice requires comparable treatment for members of a
class where that class is defined by some criteria of justice for a particular
purpose. Evaluation of comparative justice requires two comparisons. The
first involves comparison of the individuals on the applicable criteria of
justice for the purpose in question, and the second involves comparison of
treatment. Dissimilar treatment of those who do not differ in a
corresponding manner on the applicable criteria of justice constitutes
comparative injustice. Alternately, similar treatment ofthose who differ on
the applicable criteria constitutes comparative injustice. 4 Analogous to
noncomparative justice, a comprehensive comparative justification of
capital punishment by a criminal justice system would involve three steps.
The first would demonstrate that offenders who received capital
punishment resemble one another according to systemic sentencing
standards and that they differ according to these sentencing standards from
those who did not receive capital punishment. The second step would
justify the systemic standards of similarity and difference by the principles
of political morality represented by the legal system, and the third step
would justify these systemic standards according to defensible moral
principles.
Although comparative and noncomparative justice are subject to
evaluation from critical or systemic perspectives, I emphasize the systemic
perspective because the immediate purpose of this Article involves
clarification of the purported conflicts within constitutional doctrine.
Systemic standards of noncomparative and comparative justice in capital
sentencing converge in the following manner. A specific capital offender
receives noncomparative justice by systemic standards if that offender
receives either capital punishment or an alternative asjustified by systemic
sentencing criteria that identify those who merit capital punishment and
those who do not. A capital sentencing decision that does not correspond
to systemic criteria constitutes noncomparative injustice by systemic
standards.
Comparative justice by systemic standards requires that all offenders
who are similar according to systemic sentencing criteria receive similar
sentences. Arbitrary or discriminatory departures from consistent
application of systemic sentencing criteria constitute comparative injustice
by systemic standards. That is, departures from consistent sentencing
without corresponding justificatory differences as measured by systemic

64. See FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 267-71.
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criteria of noncomparative justice represent comparative injustice. Thus,
comparative and noncomparativejustice are conceptually related as applied
to retributive justice generally and capital punishment specifically. The
applicable criteria of noncomparative justice provide the standards by
which individuals are compared for the purpose of comparative justice.65
In short, comparative and noncomparative justice in capital sentencing are
not only compatible, but consistent application of the latter constitutes the
former. Any criminal justice system that consistently applies its criteria of
noncomparative justice does comparative justice by systemic standards,
and any failure of comparative justice represents a departure from the
standards of noncomparative justice in at least some cases. 66 The capital
sentencing criteria remain subject to systemic evaluation by principles
embedded in the broader set of legal institutions and to critical evaluation
by defensible moral principles.
IV. SUPREME COURT DOcTRINES AS NONCOMPARATIVE AND
COMPARATIVE JUSTICE

The requirement of individualized assessment in capital cases
represents an application of the principle of noncomparative justice
mandating that each person receives the treatment he deserves according
to systemic criteria for capital punishment. By requiring that the sentencer
consider all characteristics of the offender and of the offense that are
relevant to the criteria of noncomparative justice, the Court pursues
comprehensive and fine-grained evaluation of the offender according to the
applicable criteria of noncomparative justice for capital sentencing.
Although the Court's discussions of the retributive purpose of
punishment and of human dignity and respect for humanity associated with
the Eighth Amendment have been vague and ambiguous across Justices
and cases, several opinions indicate that these two notions are related. 67
These opinions indicate that the concern for human dignity often addressed
by the Court reflects the retributive requirement that the sentencer treat
65. Seei. at 281.

66. Some theorists would argue that this pattern applies to comparative and noncomparative
justice generally. These theorists contend that noncomparativejustice addresses the just treatment
of individuals according to the applicable standards of individual merit or desert. Comparative
justice represents an attribute of institutions that consistently treat individuals as required by the
applicable criteria on noncomparative justice. Phillip Montague, Comparative and NonComparativeJustice,30 PHIL Q. 131,131-32 (1980). I take no position here on this broad question
because this Article addresses only retributive justice as applied to capital sentencing.
67. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 513-15 (1993) (Souter, L, dissenting); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-75 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); id. at 382 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,798-801 (1982); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
319-23,335-38 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173,181-82 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,303-05 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
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each defendant as a responsible moral agent and, thus, that the sentencer
sentence each defendant in a manner consistent with that individual's
culpability.6 The precise conceptions of human dignity, retribution, and
culpability lack clarity in those opinions. "Culpability" in a narrow sense
can refer to the mental state required as an element of the offense. To say
that an individual is culpable in this sense is to say that the individual
engaged in the criminal conduct with a mental state such as knowledge or
recklessness as required by the offense definition.69
In a broader sense, however, an individual is culpable if the person is
blameworthy or deserves punishment for the criminal conduct. 7 Factors
relevant to culpability in this broader sense include but are not limited to
the mental states that render offenders culpable in the narrower sense. The
opinions sometimes discuss moral or personal culpability as opposed to
strictly legal guilt, and they identify considerations of character, record,
circumstances, background, impairment, duress, emotional pressure, and
provocation as relevant to these judgments of culpability."' Thus, these
opinions apparently contemplate a relatively broad notion of culpability as
blameworthiness or desert, and they address culpability in this sense as an
important criterion of retributive justice in capital sentencing.
Reasonable legislatures and sentencers can certainly differ in their
understanding of the range of factors relevant to culpability in this sense.
They might also differ regarding the significance they vest in any particular
evidence offered as relevant to culpability. The general principle that
individual culpability represents an important consideration in capital
sentencing is reasonably well-established, however, and thus evidence of
decreased culpability qualifies as relevant mitigating evidence. Similarly,
the requirement that the offender must be allowed to present and the
sentencer must consider all evidence that falls within some suitably defined
range of mitigating evidence is well-established This requirement of
individualized assessment is designed to promote sentencer consideration
of all evidence relevant to the accurate assessment of the offender by the
systemic criteria of noncomparative retributive justice in capital
sentencing. Thus, this requirement represents the application of the
principle of noncomparative justice to capital sentencing.

68. See cases cited supra note 67.

69. MODELPENALCODE § 2.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
70. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 385 (7th ed. 1999); TME NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGUSH
DICTIONARY, supra note 57, at 568.
71. Graham,506 U.S. at513-17 (Souter, L, dissenting); Penry,492 U.S. at 319-28, 335-40;
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 107-12 (1982); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04 (Stewart, J.,
plurality opinion).
72. Penry, 492 U.S. at 315-28; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110-15; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
602-08 (1978); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss3/2

18

Schopp: Reconciling "Irreconcilable" Capital Punishment Doctrine as Compa
RECONCIUNG IRRECONCILABLE CAPIFAL PUNISHMENTDOC7RINE

493

The Court's doctrine of guided discretion, including both narrowing of
the set of death-eligible offenders and channeling of sentencer discretion
in selecting from among that set, represents the requirement of comparative
justice that similar cases receive similar treatment. Fully stated, however,
the Aristotelian formal principle of comparative justice requires that
similar cases receive similar treatment and that morally dissimilar cases
receive treatment
that differs in proportion to their morally relevant
73
differences.
As applied to retributive justice, the formal principle of comparative
justice requires that sentencers consistently apply the principles and criteria
of retributivejustice to each convicted perpetrator. Insofar as the Court has
held that the conception of human dignity applicable to the Eighth
Amendment requires that each individual is sentenced according to that
person's culpability as informed by all relevant evidence regarding his
character and the circumstances of the offense, comparative justice
requires that the sentencer consistently apply these criteria to all convicted
perpetrators. Thus, convicted individuals who demonstrate similar
culpability according to systemic criteria should receive similar sentences,
and those who differ significantly from each other according to these
criteria should receive sentences that differ in a manner that reflects these
differences. Similarly, insofar as sentences are understood as addressing
additional criteria of justified punishment such as crime prevention in
addition to culpability, the formal principle of comparativejustice requires
that sentencing authorities consistently apply the full set of applicable
principles and criteria of justified punishment to convicted perpetrators.
In short, comparativejustice by systemic standards in capital sentencing
simply requires consistent application of the systemic principles and
criteria of retributive justice to all capital defendants. Thus, the two
requirements of guided discretion to promote comparative justice and of
individualized assessment of all evidence relevant to retributive justice are
not only consistent with each other, consistent application of the latter
constitutes the former. As applied in the context of capital punishment,
sentencers fulfill the requirements of noncomparative justice by systemic
standards when they engage in individualized assessment of each offender
by considering all evidence relevant to the systemic principles and criteria
of capital sentencing. Guided discretion promotes consistent application of
these same principles and criteria across cases in order to pursue

73. FEINBERO, supranote 59, at 278.
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comparative justice. 74 No contradiction or tension arises between the
requirements of individualized assessment and guided discretion.
V. RELOCATING THE TENSION: THREE CENTRAL AMBIGUmES

Some Supreme Court opinions and some commentators interpret the
line of cases addressing individualized assessment as granting the
sentencer unconstrained discretion to withhold capital punishment.75
Interpreted in this manner, individualized assessment undermines both
noncomparative and comparative justice because it authorizes each
sentencer to withhold capital punishment for any reason or for no reason
at all.76 It undermines noncomparative justice because it abandons the
obligation to sentence each offender according to culpability or other
identifiable principles or criteria of retributive justice. The absence of
sentencer obligation to sentence according to articulated principles or
criteria of noncomparative justice that identify this offender as one who
qualifies for capital punishment or for exemption from capital punishment
also undermines comparative justice. Insofar as the Court allows
approaches to sentencing that place no limits on the reasons for which a
sentencer can choose to withhold capital punishment, each sentencer has
the authority to apply idiosyncratic grounds for withholding capital
punishment in a particular case. This authority precludes consistent
articulation and application of a stable set of principles or criteria across
cases, undermining comparative justice. This failure to articulate such
principles or criteria for consistent application across cases promotes the
probability of arbitrary or discriminatory differences among cases as
sentencers apply idiosyncratic bases for sentencing.
It is important to recognize that this problem does not arise only for
sentencers who fail to understand instructions or who distort the sentencing
process with bias. Rather, this problem arises from this interpretation of the
individualized assessment doctrine. Conscientious, well-intentioned
sentencers who accurately understand their responsibilities under this
interpretation of the doctrine will undermine comparative justice and
noncomparative justice by systemic standards. They will do so by

74. Id. at278-81; Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,484-92 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas presents this notion in a limited form when he addresses the individualized
assessmentlineofauthorityas intended to reduce arbitrary ordiscriminatory sentencingbyfocusing

jury attention on relevant factors. He rejects the notion that the jury is authorized to express a
reasoned moral response, however, because he interprets such a response as unbounded. Id. at 49297. Contra id. at 515 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Graham, 506 U.S. at 492-97 (Thomas, J., concurring); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
715-19 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complete discretion); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,87072 (1983) (absolute discretion); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 378-82.
76. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 381-82.
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conscientiously applying reasons to refrain from sentencing to capital
punishment that differ across sentencers and that depart from the principles
of retributive justice underlying the criminal justice system. In short, if one
interprets individualized assessment as including unlimited discretion to
withhold capital punishment, the problematic tension does not occur
between guided discretion for the purpose of comparative justice and
individualized assessment for the purpose of noncomparative justice.
Rather, the tension arises between individualized assessment and both
comparative and noncomparative justice by systemic standards.
Three central ambiguities contribute to this state of affairs that arguably
undermines comparative justice by preventing consistency of sentencing
standards across cases and undermines noncomparative justice by
rendering individual sentencing decisions increasingly subject to
unintended distortion by idiosyncratic standards, bias, or confusion. These
ambiguities permeate the discussion of individualized assessment and
render it difficult to interpret or assess this requirement.
A. MitigatingEvidence
The first ambiguity involves the range of mitigating evidence
addressed. A series of cases establish the requirement of individualized
assessment in capital sentencing by requiring that courts admit and
sentencers consider all evidence that might support the rejection of capital
punishment for a particular offender. These cases articulate this
requirement in an ambiguous fashion, however, as some passages refer to
relevant mitigating evidence while other passages in the same opinions
refer to all evidence the offender proffers as mitigating. 7 Formulations of
the first type address a body of evidence that qualifies as mitigating or
potentially mitigating as defined by some standard of relevance to some
identifiable principles or criteria of mitigation. Formulations of the second
type, in contrast, apparently cede to the convicted offender the authority to
define the body of evidence to be considered. The proper interpretation of
this ambiguity depends partially on the justifiable range of sentencer
discretion, and this range depends partially on the applicable principles and
criteria ofnoncomparativejustice. That is, noncomparativejustice requires
that sentencers have access to information relevant to the selection of the
proper sentence according to the applicable principles and criteria of
retributive justice. Thus, these principles and criteria partially define the
proper range of evidence admitted. For this reason, resolution of this
ambiguity requires consideration of the third ambiguity discussed below.

77. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) (proffers, relevant mitigating
evidence); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (proffers), 115, 117 (relevant mitigating evidence); Lockett,
438 U.S. at 604 (proffers), 608 (relevant mitigating factors).
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B. Justice andMercy
The second ambiguity involves the proper range of sentencer authority
to sentence according to principles and criteria of justice or of mercy. It is
not entirely clear whether the cases authorize sentencers to exercise mercy
in addition to considering the relevant reasons for exercising leniency in
justice. Although some opinions tend to discuss either or both without
drawing a clear distinction between the two, mercy is ordinarily understood
as involving treatment better than the individual can demand in justice. 8
Thus, decisions to withhold capital punishment based on mercy would
involve departures from sentences based strictly on the applicable
principles and criteria of retributive justice. If sentencers have authority to
depart from justice in order to exercise mercy, one must ask whether this
authority extends only to the application of systemic principles or criteria
of mercy, or whether it includes complete discretion to exercise mercy on
any basis the sentencer considers appropriate. The Court opinions
apparently contemplate sentencer consideration of all evidence that might
provide good reason to refrain from applying capital punishment, but the
proper nature and range of these reasons remains obscure."

C. Community Values
The third ambiguity occurs in references to the sentencing jury as the
source of community values. These passages require clarification and
integration with the concern regarding the proper range of mitigating
evidence previously discussed as the first ambiguity. Various Supreme
Court opinions include a,,80.~
variety of phrases such-8as-s "contemporary8
community values,"'
"conscience
of the community,
social values,
"societal values,, ' 3 "societal acceptance,"' ' "public attitudes,"' S or
"standards of our citizens." 6 It is not clear whether the values these

78. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203 (1976) (Stewart, ., plurality opinion) (mercy);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, L, plurality opinion)
(compassionate or mitigating factors); ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEENSES AND JUST
CONVICrIONS § 6.3.5, at 180-83 (1998).

79. SeeSkipper,476U.S. at4-5;Eddings,455U.S. at 112-17;Locketu,438 U.S. at599-605;
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-87 (Stewart, J.,
plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 (Stewart,
J., plurality opinion).
80. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
81. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987).
82. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 297 (Stewart, J.,
plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 298.
84. Id.
85. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
86. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,379 (1989) (Scalia, L,plurality opinion).
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references authorize the jury to apply consist of the jurors' personal values
as representatives of the community, their understanding of the generally
accepted informal community view, or the values the community has
institutionalized through the legal institutions that provide officially
enacted standards of that community. Clarification of this ambiguity
requires integration with the first identified ambiguity (regarding the range
of evidence as all relevant mitigating evidence or as all evidence the
offender proffers as mitigating) because the proper range of evidence
depends partially on the range of considerations the jury legitimately
reviews in its role as the conscience of the community.
D. The Ambiguities and the Principlesof Comparative
andNoncomparativeJustice
The first ambiguity seriously undermines the pursuit of comparative
justice if it is understood as requiring that offenders may admit and
sentencers must consider any evidence the offender proffers as mitigating.
On this interpretation, offenders can enter any evidence that they consider
mitigating, and each sentencer can and must evaluate the mitigating effect
of the evidence entered according to that sentencer's understanding of
statutory factors and of community standards. Thus, capital punishment
decisions may turn on types of evidence and interpretations of
unarticulated community standards that vary substantially from case to
case, reducing the probability of principled consistency across cases. It is
important to recognize here that if the sentencer must consider any
evidence that the offender proffers as mitigating, the category of mitigating
evidence is idiosyncratic not merely in the sense that it might include
factual circumstances that are specific to the case, but also in the sense that
the principles and criteria of mitigation might be idiosyncratic to a
particular offender and sentencer. If various offenders offer evidence
regarding idiosyncratic claims of mitigation and various sentencers apply
idiosyncratic principles or criteria of mitigation, they alter the systemic
principles and criteria ofretributivejustice. By varying these principles and
criteria from case to case, sentencers undermine comparative justice, and
they deviate from noncomparative justice by systemic standards.
The second ambiguity interacts with the first in that one who exercises
mercy treats another better than justice demands. Thus, acts of mercy
constitute departures from strict justice.8 7 If sentencers are authorized to
depart from justice in order to exercise mercy, and they are authorized to
do so on their evaluation of any evidence that offenders proffer as
mitigating, there seem to be no legal limitations on the potential grounds
for withholding capital punishment and no explicit guidelines for the

87. ScHopp, supra note 78, § 6.3.5, at 180-83.
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exercise of this unlimited discretion. Understood in this manner, the
Court's doctrine allows departures from noncomparative justice by
systemic standards, and it provides no basis to expect the principled
consistency across cases that would meet the requirements of comparative
justice.
Regarding the third ambiguity, the Court's vague references to a variety
of phrases addressing community or societal values, conscience, or
acceptance exacerbate the previously discussed concerns regarding
comparative and noncomparative justice. Juries may violate the
requirement of consistent application of the criteria of retributive justice
if they apply different community values to the evidence proffered as
mitigating in different cases. This might occur either because they
represent different communities with different values, because values vary
significantly within communities, or because different jurors have different
views regarding these values. These sources of variation can undermine
comparative and noncomparativejustice because theycan cause sentencers
to apply principles and criteria of justice or mercy that depart from one
another and from systemic standards of retributive justice.
In summary, these three ambiguities create serious concerns regarding
the ability of current Court doctrine to promote comparative or
noncomparative justice. The unbounded scope of evidence that can be
admitted as mitigating injustice or in mercy under some interpretations of
individualized assessment, in combination with the lack of clear criteria or
guidelines for evaluating the mitigating effect of that evidence, generates
the potential for broad variability in the standards sentencers use to
measure noncomparative justice. By allowing the standards of
noncomparative justice to vary from case to case, these conditions allow
departures from noncomparativejustice by systemic standards. Similarly,
they undermine comparative justice by promoting the probability of
unprincipled variation from case to case, generating the arbitrary or
discriminatory sentencing variations that were the object of the Court's
concern in Furman.
VI. AN INTEGRATED INTEMRMATION
A. All MitigatingEvidence
The Court's language regarding the range of evidence that the trial
court must admit and the sentencer must consider is ambiguous between
and within cases. Some passages in some opinions require admission and
consideration of all evidence the offender proffers as mitigating.' Some

88. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
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passages in some opinions require admission and consideration of all
relevant mitigating evidence or of "constitutionally relevant evidence."8 9
Taken literally, the "proffers" formulation allocates the authority to define
the parameters of mitigation to the convicted offender who can present any
evidence he considers appropriate for mitigation and to the sentencer who
may or may not find mitigating effect as it sees fit. The sentencer may not
be prevented as a matter of law from considering the proffered evidence,
nor may the sentencer refuse to consider that evidence. The sentencer may,
however, interpret the significance of that evidence.' That is, according to
this interpretation, law places no boundaries on the conditions that may or
may not mitigate.
Justice Scalia interprets the line of authority mandating individualized
assessment in this manner, and this interpretation contributes to his
conclusion that these cases are irreconcilable with guided discretion.91 He
contends that sentencers cannot have limited discretion in the decision to
apply capital punishment but unlimited discretion to withhold it because
sentencers do not make separate decisions whether to apply and whether
to withhold capital punishment.' Rather, they make a single sentencing
decision in which they either apply capital punishment or they do not, and
each sentencer's discretion in making that single decision either is limited
or it is not. 3 Others have rejected the contention that these requirements
are irreconcilable by applying the guided discretion and individualized
assessment ^principles to the eligibility and selection decisions
respectively." According to this interpretation, there is no contradiction in
limiting the sentencer's discretion through a variety of statutory
mechanisms during the eligibility phase in order to discipline the process
through which the sentencer identifies those who are eligible for capital
punishment but then allowing the sentencer unbounded discretion to
exercise
mercy in withholding capital punishment during the selection
95
phase.
On the face of the dispute, the critics are correct. Consider, for example,
a statute that guides discretion in the eligibility phase by requiring that a
sentencer find an enumerated aggravating factor in order to render the
offender eligible for capital punishment but allows unbounded discretion
110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
89. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,367 (1993); Skipper, 476 U.S. at4; Eddings,455 U.S.
at 111-12, 115,117; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
. 90. Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368; Eddings,455 U.S. at 114-15.
91. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,662-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Walton, 497 U.S. at 715-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Martha C.Nussbaum, Equity and
Mercy, 22 PriL &PUB. AFF. 83, 116-17 (1993).
95. Walton, 497 U.S. at715-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nussbaum, supranote 94, at 116-17.
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in withholding capital punishment from some of those who are eligible.
Such a provision articulates a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
capital punishment. That is, sentencers may not apply capital punishment
unless they meet the necessary condition of finding an enumerated
aggravating factor, but having done so, they are authorized but not required
to apply it. Other circumstances in which decision makers must meet
necessary conditions in order to decide or act in a certain manner but are
then allowed to exercise discretion in deciding not to so act are not
unusual. Bartenders, for example, may not serve alcohol unless the
customer fulfills the necessary condition of meeting the legal age
requirement, but bartenders can then exercise discretion in refusing for a
variety of reasons to serve alcohol to some of those who meet this
necessary condition. Similarly, police officers may not legitimately cite or
arrest individuals unless they fulfill the necessary condition of meeting the
probable cause standard. Yet, they may exercise discretion in refraining
from citing or arresting some of those who meet this standard.'
These responses demonstrate that provisions limiting discretion in the
application of capital punishment but allowing unlimited discretion to
refrain from doing so are coherent, but they do not address the substantive
force of the objection. The substantive concerns involve the principles of
comparative and noncomparativejustice that underlie the guided discretion
and individualized assessment requirements. If one assumes that the
eligibility requirements narrow the field of death-eligible offenders to those
who qualify for capital punishment according to noncomparative principles
and criteria of retributive justice by systemic standards, unbounded
discretion to refrain from applying capital punishment will result in some
of these death-eligible offenders receiving less severe punishment than
they merit. On this assumption, however, it appears that such discretion
will not result in any offenders receiving more severe punishment than they
merit. Thus, some might argue that unbounded discretion to exercise mercy
is acceptable because it does not result in any offender receiving worse
treatment than deserved.
This argument fails to address two concerns regarding this
interpretation of the relationship between the two principles. First, the
claim that no one receives more severe punishment than merited by
systemic standards rests upon the premise that the eligibility process
identifies only those who merit capital punishment by systemic standards
of retributive justice. The minimal narrowing requirements of the
eligibility process, such as the identification of an enumerated aggravating
factor, do not preclude the possibility that the full set of aggravating and
96. CHARLES H. WHMMREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRMIAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OFCASES AND CONCEPTS § 3.03, at 75-77 (3d ed. 1993) (probable cause); id. § 1.03, at
9-11 (discretion).
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mitigating circumstances undermine the justification of capital punishment
by systemic standards. Thus, some individuals who qualify as deatheligible may not merit capital punishment when all relevant factors are
considered. For these individuals, unbounded discretion in the selection
process might produce capital sentences in circumstances in which guided
discretion in the selection process would prevent a sentence of capital
punishment.
Second, even if one accepts the premise that such a process precludes
any offender from receiving punishment more severe than he merits by
systemic standards of retributive justice, unbounded discretion allows
departures from comparative justice and from noncomparative justice in
the form of leniency. Such discretion in the selection phase allows
departures from systemic standards of noncomparative justice in that it
allows some offenders who merit capital punishment by systemic standards
to escape that merited punishment. Such departures from systemic
standards of noncomparative justice also constitute comparative injustice
because those who benefit from these departures receive punishment that
differs from that received by others without findings of corresponding
differences in the properties that provide the basis for judgments of merit
by systemic standards of retributive justice. These differences constitute
comparative injustice in the form of arbitrary or discriminatory differences
among relevantly similar offenders. In order to understand the force of
Justice Scalia's claim ofirreconcilability in its strongest form, we must ask
whether unbounded discretion to withhold capital punishment is
reconcilable with the principles of noncomparative and comparative justice
that underlie the legal doctrine. Should we care about departures from
comparative justice only if they involve some individuals receiving more
severe punishment than they merit, or should we care about comparative
injustice even when those departures from comparativejustice consistently
violate the principles of noncomparative justice in the direction of
leniency?
The proffers formulation of the individualized assessment requirement
undermines the pursuit of comparative justice by increasing the risk of
arbitrary or discriminatory variations among cases in violation of the
Furman principle of guided discretion. Furthermore, absent legal
articulation of a relatively clear conception of mitigation, it does so at two
levels of abstraction. At the more concrete level, it authorizes the sentencer
to decide whether the specific condition or circumstance presented by the
offender should mitigate according to identified principles of mitigation
such as culpability. One sentencer might decide, for example, that certain
psychological traits should mitigate because they reduce individual
culpability. Another sentencer might decide that those traits should not
mitigate because they are insufficient to reduce culpability, and a third
might interpret the same conditions as supporting the application of capital
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punishment because they enhance culpability. At the more abstract level,
this approach authorizes sentencers to decide the relevant principles and
criteria of mitigation such that one sentencer might decide that mitigation
requires a showing of decreased desert while another might decide that
mitigation requires a showing of decreased risk of future harmful conduct,
and a third might require a demonstration of remorse. That is, various
sentencers might diverge not only on their evaluation of the mitigating
force of certain evidence but also on the appropriate principles and criteria
of mitigation by which they evaluate this evidence.
Divergence at the more concrete level of interpretation involves
differential evaluation of the specific evidence presented and may be
unavoidable to some degree in a system that requires weighing of evidence
regarding unique circumstances by case-specific sentencers. Divergence at
the more abstract level, however, arguably involves abandonment of the
core of the comparative justice project by authorizing application of
different substantive principles and standards to different offenders
ostensibly subject to the same law. Finally, insofar as legal institutions seek
noncomparativejustice by systemic standards embodied in law, divergence
among sentencers at the more abstract level undermines noncomparative
justice because at least some of those sentencers apply principles and
criteria of noncomparative justice that diverge from systemic standards.
Review of the Supreme Court opinions supports interpretation of these
opinions as requiring admission and consideration of all relevant
mitigating evidence as defined by systemic standards of relevance
regarding the principles and criteria of retributive justice applicable to
sentencing decisions in a particular legal system. The Eddings decision
provides one of the seminal opinions in the line of authority establishing
this requirement, and that opinion reviews and explains the mitigating
relevance of the disputed evidence regarding the defendant's age, family
background, and emotional disturbance.' If this line of authority required
admission and consideration of any evidence the offender proffered as
mitigating, the Court's evaluation of relevance would carry no weight and
serve no purpose. That is, the only question regarding admissibility would
involve the offenders intent in proffering it. A determination that the
offender proffered it as mitigating would decide the matter regardless of
the Court's evaluation of relevance. Thus, the Court's review of relevance
repudiates the interpretation of the case as establishing that courts must
admit all evidence proffered. Rather, the Court's discussion of the
relevance of the proffered evidence regarding the offender's responsibility
and blameworthiness supports the interpretation of individualized
assessment as requiring consideration of all evidence that is relevant to the

97. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-17.
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systemic justification of capital punishment as established in applicable
statutes and in prior cases. Other cases reveal a similar pattern in that the
opinions review the relevance of the disputed evidence to the culpability
of the offender."
In addition to providing an interpretation of individualized assessment
that is consistent with the manner in which these opinions applied it, this
approach renders this requirement consistent with the broader body of
Supreme Court capital punishment law. It supports an interpretation of the
individualized assessment requirement that enables sentencers to meet that
requirement through a process that is consistent with the principle of
guided discretion. That principle mandates sentencing practices designed
to reduce arbitrariness or discrimination in sentencing. The Woodson
plurality provided an early articulation of the individualized assessment
requirement as necessary to reduce the probability of arbitrary differences
in sentencing associated with unguided jury nullification of mandatory
capital punishment statutes and to reduce the probability of arbitrary
consistency in the form of similar sentencing of relevantly dissimilar
offenders."
The Lockett Court presented the requirement of individualized
assessment as rooted in the principle of guided discretion from Furman,
Gregg, and Woodson, rather than as a contrary or competing
requirement." The Lockett Court interprets the Furman opinions as
rejecting the arbitrary selection of a few offenders for capital punishment
from among a large number of capital offenders. 10 1 The Lockett Court
interprets the Gregg and Woodson decisions as addressing this problem of
arbitrary sentencing by establishing a process of guided discretion through
which sentencers apply statutory sentencing standards to each offender
with due consideration of that offender's character and record. 1° 2 In this
manner, the Court presented individualized assessment as promoting the
purpose of guided discretion by providing sentencers with the information
about the offender and the offense that sentencers need in order to
accurately apply sentencing guidelines or criteria supplied under the
requirement of guided discretion."°3 Furthermore, this interpretation
renders individualized assessment consistent with the Court's recognition

98. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 385-86 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461,512-21 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting);Penry v. Lynaugh,492 U.S. 302,322-

28 (1989).
99. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,302-05 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality).
100. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,599-606 (1978). But see Graham,506 U.S. at 484-92

(Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 598-99.
102. Id. at 600-02.
103. See id. at 601-05.
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of the State's authority to guide sentencer evaluation of mitigating
evidence.' 4
In short, an interpretation of individualized assessment as requiring
consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence according to systemic
standards of mitigation renders that requirement consistent with the
Court's reasoning in the early cases and with the principle of guided
discretion. In doing so, this interpretation renders consistent the
comparative and noncomparativejustice projects as manifested in Supreme
Court capital punishment doctrine. That is, the requirement of guided
discretion calls upon legislatures and courts to promote comparativejustice
by providing criteria or guidelines of retributive justice applicable to
capital sentencing for all capital offenders in a jurisdiction. Individualized
assessment involving all mitigating evidence relevant to these criteria or
guidelines promotes noncomparative justice through accurate application
in each case. Thus, the articulated criteria or guidelines provide the
common foundation in principles of retributive justice that links
comparative and noncomparative justice. The claim here is not that the
Justices who wrote these opinions had this interpretation in mind. I have
no reason to think that they had any fully articulated interpretation in mind.
Rather, this interpretation renders the Court's requirements coherent with
each other and with the underlying principles of comparative and
noncomparative justice.
Finally, the Court articulated the requirement of individualized
assessment in the proffers and relevant mitigating evidence formulations
in the same cases with no indication that these phrases were intended to
represent different standards or applications. Thus, a reasonable reading
would render the two formulations consistent. Reading the language of the
proffers formulation on its face can generate at least three distinct
interpretations. First, one could interpret it as mandating admission of all
evidence the offender offers as mitigating, without regard to ordinary
considerations of relevance, prejudicial effect, or the rules of evidence.
This reading undermines comparative and noncomparative justice by
promoting sentencing unrelated to systemic principles and criteria of
retributive justice. Furthermore, it requires that the trial court suspend its
usual functions regarding the admission of evidence, and it generates
absurd results.
Consider, for example, an offender who proffers testimony by biblical
authorities who will testify that only those who have been baptized in
Christ are among the chosen people of God. This offender could contend
that this testimony demonstrates that capital punishment would be
disproportionate to his crime because "I am a baptized Christian, and the

104. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362-66 (1993).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss3/2

30

Schopp: Reconciling "Irreconcilable" Capital Punishment Doctrine as Compa
20011

RECONCILING IRRECONCIABLE CAPITAL PUNISHMENTDOCTRINE

people I killed were only Jews, so executing me would be excessive
punishment. ' s Interpreting the line of cases requiring individualized
assessment as addressing all evidence the offender chooses to admit as
mitigating apparently requires that the trial court admit this testimony and
instruct the sentencers that they must consider it, although they may
determine its significance." Inaddition to generating absurd results, this
interpretation renders the two formulations inconsistent because the
testimony would not qualify as relevant mitigating evidence according to
any recognized principles or criteria of mitigation.
The second and third interpretations recognize that according to
ordinary usage, one proffers when one makes an offer of proof."° A party
makes an offer of proof when that party explains to the trial judge the
content of the testimony offered, the relevance of that testimony to the
questions at issue, the evidence rule under which it is admissible, and the
prejudice created by failure to admit that evidence. This proffer informs the
trial judge's ruling on admissibility and preserves the matter for appeal if
the trial judge precludes the testimony." The second interpretation would
require admission and consideration of any evidence regarding which the
offender makes an offer of proof, regardless of the court's evaluation of
that offer. This interpretation resembles the first in that it generates absurd
results and renders the two formulations inconsistent because the mere
requirement that the offender makes an offer of proof with no standard of
adequacy reduces the second interpretation to the first interpretation insofar
as it grants the offender authority to admit any evidence he chooses.
Furthermore, the requirement is incoherent because a putative "offer of
proof' that is not subject to evaluation for adequacy is not an offer of
proof. To say that a party makes an offer of proof is to say that the party
presents the appropriate information for evaluation of its adequacy in
providing reasons why the court should admit the evidence. Thus, a
putative "offer of proof' that is not subject to evaluation by standards of
adequacy is no offer of proof at all.
The third interpretation shares with the second the understanding of a
proffer as involving an offer of proof. It interprets the proffers formulation
in the Court's cases as requiring admission and consideration of evidence
the offender proffers as mitigating with an offer of proof that is adequate
to demonstrate relevance to some recognized purpose or justification of

105. Cf Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (precluding capital punishment as
disproportionate to the crime of rape, at least in the case of an adult woman).
106. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368.

107. MCCORMICKON EVIDENCE § 51, at 82-83 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
108. Id.; ROGER C. PARK Er AL, EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AS ApaED INAMERICAN TRhIS 68-70 (1998).
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punishment. 1" This interpretation avoids the absurd results generated by
the first two interpretations, and it renders the "proffers" formulation
coherent as well as consistent with the "relevant mitigating evidence"
formulation in that both require that the trial court admit and the sentencer
consider any evidence that the offender offers with a showing of its
relevance as mitigating evidence. Understood in this manner, the cases are
each internally consistent as well as consistent with each other in that each
requires that trial courts admit and sentencers consider any evidence that
the offender offers with a showing that it arguably carries mitigating
significance according to systemic principles or criteria of mitigation. In
contrast, the first two interpretations of the proffers formulation generate
absurd results, conflict with the principle of guided discretion, render cases
internally incoherent and inconsistent with other cases, and undermine
comparative and noncomparative justice.
B. Justice and Mercy
This interpretation of the first ambiguity also accommodates a plausible
and defensible approach to the second ambiguity regarding the authority
to withhold capital punishment injustice or in mercy. Decisions based on
the standards ofjustice contained in sentencing law are consistent with the
requirements of comparative and noncomparative justice in that each
decision pursues noncomparative justice by sentencing the offender
according to the principles and criteria of retributive justice contained in
the law as applied to the offender for his or her offense, and these decisions
collectively pursue comparative justice by consistently sentencing
offenders according to these same legal standards. The claim is not that all
sentencers will interpret and apply specific evidence in the same manner.
Rather, variation among sentencers will occur due to the differences in the
evidence presented and due to differences of interpretation at the relatively
concrete level of evaluation at which sentencers attempt to apply legal
principles and criteria to specific evidence. Onejudge or jury, for example,
might attribute more mitigating significance to a certain degree of
psychological impairment than would a different judge or jury. Variations
such as these occur despite common principles and criteria of retributive
justice at the relatively abstract level. Despite these variations, however,

109. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-77 (1983) (aggravating circumstance must
"reasonably justify" imposition ofa more severe sentence); Lockettv. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,599-605
(1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-87 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). This
interpretation is consistent with the Lockett Court's presentation of the requirement as arising from
the guided discretion requirement found in the earlier cases and with the GreggCourt's emphasis

on applying capital punishment in a manner that serves legitimate penal purposes.
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sentencers pursue comparative justice insofar as they apply common
principles and criteria of retributive justice.
Mercy involves departure from justice in that it involves more lenient
11 Some bodies
treatment than an individual can claim as his due injustice."
of sentencing law might authorize such departures but others might not.
Insofar as a particular sentencing scheme authorizes sentencers in making
such departures and provides guidance regarding the considerations that
support such departures, that scheme remains consistent with the
requirement of consistent treatment embodied in the principle of guided
discretion and in the comparative justice project."' An approach that
allows such departures fromjustice in order to exercise mercy but provides
no criteria or guidelines regarding the appropriate bases for the exercise of
mercy would conflict with the principle of guided discretion and with
comparativejustice. One might argue that arbitrary departures fromjustice
in the form of mercy are acceptable because they do not treat any offender
worse than that offender deserves. Such departures violate the principle of
equal treatment and the requirement of reason at the core of comparative
justice, however, in that they allow differential treatment of relevantly
similar offenders.
By requiring similar treatment of relevantly similar offenders and
proportionately dissimilar treatment of relevantly dissimilar offenders, the
formal principle of comparative justice represents the disciplined
application of reason to the distribution of punishment. Although the
arbitrary exercise of mercy toward a particular offender does not treat that
offender worse than he or she deserves, it violates the responsibility of
legal institutions generally and of capital sentencers specifically to exercise
coercive force according to reason.' Departures from the discipline of
reason for no reason at all constitute arbitrary exercises of government
authority, and departures for illegitimate reasons such as race, ethnicity,
gender, or social class constitute discriminatory exercises of such authority.
Both types of departure violate the constraints of reason that discipline the
exercise of coercive force, and both violate the principle of respect for
persons as reasoning beings that explains and justifies the significance of
110. SCHOPP, supra note 78, § 6.3.5, at 180-83.
111. Strictly speaking, systemic principles or criteria for the exercise of mercy do not provide
for comparative justice; rather, they provide a consistent bases for departures from justice. That is,
they contribute to comparative justice in a broad sense in which that notion includes principles of

justice and defensible moral bases for departing from justice in the exercise of mercy.
112. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 515 n.9 (1993) (Souter, L, dissenting) (defining
"reasoned moral response" as addressing offender culpability for the crime); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 319, 327-28 (1989) (requiring a reasoned moral response regarding the mitigating
evidence and offender culpability); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-87 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
plurality opinion) (stating that capital punishment must not be gratuitous; it must have some
legitimate penal justification); FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 283-96.
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culpability in capital sentencing specifically and in matters of retributive
justice generally.
In short, the interpretation of individualized assessment as requiring the
admission and consideration of all evidence relevant to legal principles and
criteria of mitigation is consistent with the reasoning in the Court's
opinions, and it renders coherent the apparently conflicting requirements
of guided discretion and individualized assessment in Supreme Court
doctrine. This approach can accommodate sentencing standards that
authorize mercy as well as justice, provided that these statutes articulate
some principles or criteria for the exercise of mercy. Furthermore, it
renders the Court's doctrine a plausible attempt to conform to the
complimentary underlying principles of comparative and noncomparative

justice.
C. Community Standards
1. Three Interpretations
Courts and commentators often discuss the jury's role as providing a
link between the legal system and community standards. The interpretation
of the first and second ambiguities advanced here may appear to conflict
with this role because it defines the sentencer's role as the application of
legal standards rather than as a source ofextra-legal standards. Discussions
of community standards sometimes employ a variety of similar but
different phrases including "conscience of the community,"' 13 "community7
116
"social values,""'
values,"""
118
. "societal
dars1o values," "public attitudes,""
-societal acceptance," or standards of our citizens."' 9 These phrases
and passages suggest that an important function of the jury involves
interpretation and application of the sentencing criteria in a manner
consistent with the moral views of the citizenry. The precise nature of this
responsibility remains vague, however, particularly regarding the proper
relationship between these community standards and legal standards.
Although these phrases are often used interchangeably, the language
suggests a number of significantly different interpretations. These include

113. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,310 (1987) (quotingWitherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510,519 (1968)).
114. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S.
at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
115. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,297 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
116. Id. at 298 (Stewart, ., plurality opinion).
117. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
118. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 298 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).

119. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,379 (1989) (Scalia, L, plurality opinion).
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at least the following three. First, these phrases may refer to the values and
standards of the jurors as a sample of the community. Understood in this

manner, jurors represent community values by exercising their personal
values. Second, these phrases may refer to an informal social consensus
among the population of the community, and the jury may be expected to
be aware of and apply the standards of this informal consensus.
Understood in this mannerjurors represent community values by applying
what they believe to be the values generally accepted in the community,
regardless of whether or not the jurors share these values. Third,
particularly when phrased as "societal values," "societal acceptance,"
"public attitudes," or "standards of our citizens," these terms may refer to
the moral values the community has officially adopted as societal standards
through the legal process. That is, these phrases may refer to the moral
standards the citizens of a society have collectively adopted by
institutionalizing them in the law of the community.' 20 Clarification of this
ambiguity requires integrated analysis of this question and of the
previously discussed ambiguity regarding the range of evidence as all
relevant mitigating evidence or as all evidence the offender proffers as
mitigating. A coherent institution of capital punishment must define the
proper range of evidence in a manner that provides the jury with the
information it needs to fulfill its legitimate functions, including its properly
defined role as the conscience of the community.
The Court's vague references to these various phrases raise an
important concern regarding the likelihood that juries will violate the
requirement of consistent application of the principles or criteria of
retributive justice if they apply different community standards in different
cases. This might occur either because they represent different
communities with different values, because values vary significantly within
communities, because different jurors have different views regarding these
values, or because jurors vary regarding their personal values.
At an abstract level, juries would apply the same principle if each jury
applied the standards applicable in the community at issue. That is, all
juries would fulfill the responsibility to apply community standards if each
applied the principles of retributive justice accepted in the community in
which the crime and trial took place.' Within this abstract level of
consistency, however, criteria could vary across juries in a number of ways.
First, standards could differ across communities. Some communities might
emphasize culpability, for example, while others might emphasize remorse
or risk of future criminal behavior. Second, different communities could
apply different interpretations of the same principles such that similar

120. SCHOwP, supranote 78, § 6.3.3, at 175.
121. This proposition presumes no changes of venue.
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conditions could carry different weight under a single principle as applied
in two different communities. Regarding the principle that punishment
should be in proportion to culpability, for example, economic or emotional
hardship might significantly decrease culpability according to some
community standards but not according to others.
Third, any particular community might lack a single community
interpretation of a principle such as that requiring sentencing according to
culpability, either because various subsets of that community endorse
different interpretations of that principle or because no reasonably clear or
specific interpretation has developed within that community. In either of
these circumstances, the community would lack consensus regarding the
appropriate measure of culpability and regarding the significance of
various circumstances or conditions for culpability. " Fourth, some or all
juries may fail to represent the community standard because the specific
compositions of those juries do not reflect the communities. Given the size
of juries and the manner in which they are selected, it would not be
surprising to discover that few juries fully represent the communities from
which they are drawn."'
These concerns illustrate the inadequacy of the Court's vague reference
to community values, but they do not create a contradiction or a tension in
principle between noncomparative justice and comparative justice
understood as consistent application of the principles and criteria of
noncomparative justice. That is, consistent application of the criteria of
noncomparative justice at the appropriate level of abstraction remains
possible, although consistent application requires at least that one specifies
the principles that constitute the community values and the level of
abstraction at which the sentencer should apply them.
If one interprets community values as addressing the values held by the
jury as a sample of the community, then comparativejustice in the abstract
requires that each jury apply the principles and criteria of noncomparative
justice held by the members of that jury. This interpretation would allow
marked inconsistency at the more concrete level of application, however,
because specific jurors and juries might vary substantially in the values that
they endorse as relevant to sentencing as well as in their understanding,
interpretation, and endorsement of the standards of retributive justice
contained in sentencing statutes. Thus, according to this interpretation,
several juries from the same community might represent community
values, yet apply markedly different sentencing standards.

122. If one defines a community as ajurisdiction with a coherent community standard, then
all communities must have a standard, but this merely rephrases the point; some jurisdictions will
have no community standard because these jurisdictions do not constitute communities.
123. SCHOPP, supra note 78, § 6.3.3, at 175.
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Consider, for example, a statute that lists as an aggravating factor that
the murder was committed in an attempt to commit deviant sexual
interaction and that lists as a mitigating factor that the murder was
committed under extreme mental or emotional disturbance.'24 Suppose that
expert testimony supports the offender's contention that he committed the
murder for which he has been convicted while engaging in sexual conduct
motivated by his paraphilic disorder of pedophilia which involves intense,
intrusive, and recurring sexually arousing fantasies, urges, and behavior
involving prepubescent children."2 Some juries might interpret this
evidence as revealing emotional disturbance in the form of intrusive and
intense fantasies and urges that mitigate culpability because they
undermine the capacity for reasoned reflection and control of impulses.
Other juries might consider these fantasies and urges insufficient to
mitigate. Yet other juries might interpret the same expert testimony as
supporting the state's contention that the offender fulfilled the listed
aggravating factor regarding deviant sexual interaction and as establishing
a pattern of habitual criminal activity and attitudes that further aggravate
culpability. According to the interpretation of the jurors' responsibility to
represent community values as their responsibility to apply their own
values as a sample of the community, these three sets ofjurors would all
fulfill their responsibility to represent community values while attributing
markedly discrepant significance to the evidence and applying markedly
different sentences to similar offenders. Thus, insofar as comparative
justice requires consistent application of the principles and criteria of
retributive justice at the level of concrete application involving the tangible
interests of those involved, this interpretation of community values
undermines the pursuit of comparative justice.
If one interprets the jury's responsibility as the application of
community values understood as the informal social consensus in the
community in which the crime and trial take place, then comparative
justice requires that each jury applies the principles and criteria of
noncomparative justice endorsed by the informal social consensus in their
jurisdiction. This interpretation can also undermine comparative justice.
First, community standards may well vary substantially across
communities within a single legal jurisdiction, generating dissimilar
treatment of similar cases ostensibly subject to a single statute. Second,
even if a broad consensus occurs within a specific jurisdiction, different

124. MODELPENALCODB

§ 210.6(3)(e), .6(4)(b) (1999).

125. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF

MENTALDISORDERS 527-28 (4thed. 1994) (pedophiliaas aspecificdisorderoftheparaphilictype);
see also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,467 (Utah 1988) (Defendant contended that "homosexual
pedophilia with narcissistic overtones" constituted extreme mental or emotional distress reducing
murder to manslaughter.).
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jurors or juries may have different impressions of that standard because
juries may not consist of representative samples of the jurisdiction. Third,
particularly with regard to controversial issues such as capital punishment,
no consensus may occur either across the jurisdiction or within any
subdivision of it. Thus, in some cases, no jury can apply a community
consensus because none occurs. All of these circumstances can generate
dissimilar treatment of similar cases.
In summary, each of the first two interpretations raises serious concerns
regarding comparative justice. Furthermore, both encounter an additional
common objection. According to either interpretation, community values
can directly conflict with enacted law. Thus, if juries' responsibilities
under law include the responsibilities to apply the law as instructed and to
represent community values, juries may have an incoherent set of
responsibilities that include the obligation to apply the legal standard and
the obligation to depart from that same standard.
Alternately, if one interprets "community values" as referring to the
principles and criteria of political morality the community has collectively
adopted by establishing law embodying those values, then community
values neither vary within a jurisdiction nor conflict with enacted law.
According to this interpretation, sentencers can satisfy the requirements of
comparativejustice by consistently applying the legal criteria ofretributive
justice to all convicted perpetrators. Insofar as these contain general
notions, sentencers must exercise judgment in interpreting and applying
them, but the task of various sentencers involves the interpretation and
application of standards ofretributivejustice instantiated in law rather than
the application of personal or community standards that may vary across
sentencers. This interpretation avoids the serious concerns raised by both
alternative interpretations, and it provides for consistent application of the
standards of retributive justice represented by law.
This interpretation promotes comparative justice at the level of
principle in the sense that various juries are charged with the responsibility
to apply common standards to each offender. This charge does not prevent
variations among juries resulting from different interpretations of legal
instructions or from application of those instructions to different
circumstances. Furthermore, this interpretation of the responsibilities of
juries raises serious questions regarding the capacities of juries to
understand and apply the applicable societal standards as instantiated in
law. Thus, this interpretation is defensible in principle but raises serious
concerns about the abilities of juries to fulfill their responsibilities in
practice. Parts VII and VIII return to these concerns. Throughout the
remainder of this Article, I use "societal standards" to refer to community
standards interpreted as those standards adopted by the society collectively
through its legal institutions.
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2. Community Values as Societal Standards
The interpretation of community values applied to capital sentencing
as the societal standards collectively adopted through legal institutions is
more consistent than either of the other interpretations with the reasoning
in the Supreme Court's capital punishment cases, the concurrent pursuit of
noncomparative and comparative justice, and the principles of political
morality underlying the criminal justice system of a liberal society. As
interpreted here, the Court's opinions establishing the requirements of
individualized assessment and guided discretion pursue noncomparative
and comparative justice respectively. As applied to retributive justice,
systemic noncomparative justice requires that the sentencer prescribe the
sentence due the offender for the offense according to the principles that
justify punishment in that criminal justice system.
Although the opinions of various Justices differ regarding these
principles, the opinions generally endorse deterrence and retribution as
legitimate penal purposes thatjustify punishment.26 These opinions do not
provide precise conceptions of deterrence or retribution, but the ongoing
emphasis in several opinions on the culpability of the offender for the
offense is consistent with a retributive justification of punishment. 2 7
Later cases addressing the application of capital punishment to
juveniles and to mentally retarded offenders reflect the significance of
personal culpability as an important criterion of justified capital

punishment. Although the various opinions differ regarding the proper
approach to capital sentencing with juvenile or mentally retarded offenders,
they share the common premise that these conditions are important to
capital sentencing because they are relevant to the culpability of the
offenders as individuals or as a class.12 These cases emphasize
noncomparative justice as the principle requiring punishment of each
offender in the manner appropriate to that individual's merits according to
the systemic criteria of sentencing, and they emphasize culpability as an
important criterion for the justification of capital punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. Some critics might contest the Court's identification
of individual culpability as an appropriate criterion for capital punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.'" For the purpose of the immediate

126. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, L, plurality); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 355 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
127. See cases cited supra note 67 (addressing culpability); Moore, supra note 61, at 181-82.
128. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 516-17 (1993) (Souter, L, dissenting); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492U.S. 361,374-75 (1989) (Scalia, ., plurality opinion); Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302,319-28 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,833-37 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion).
129. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 236-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (objecting to retribution as a

legitimate penal purpose of punishment).
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analysis, however, the important point is that the Court has identified
culpability as an important societal criterion and that each sentencer acts
consistently with the requirements of noncomparative justice by systemic
standards when that sentencer sentences a defendant in a manner consistent
with the societal values represented by systemic criteria.
As argued previously, consistent application of the criteria of
noncomparative justice constitutes comparative justice by systemic
standards. Thus, by establishing legal criteria of noncomparative justice
that remain constant across cases within ajurisdiction, the criminal justice
system would facilitate comparative justice. Although the community
conscience as represented by the personal values of the jurors as a sample
of the community or by the informal social consensus as understood by the
jury might vary considerably from case to case, the societal values
instantiated in law remain relatively constant across cases, absent
fundamental changes in the relevant body of law. Thus, by interpreting
"community values" as the societal values that the members of a society
adopt collectively by enacting them as law as well as the underlying
principles of political morality represented by that body of law, the
criminal justice system adopts principles and criteria of noncomparative
justice that remain relatively constant across cases and facilitate
comparative justice.
This interpretation coheres with the principles of political morality
underlying the legal institutions of a liberal society because it sentences
offenders according to the principles and criteria adopted through the legal
and political institutions that order the public jurisdiction through
processes that provide competent adults with notice and with the
opportunity to participate. Theorists who advance variants of liberal
political theory differ regarding both their precise theoretical formulations
and the structure of political institutions they endorse.'3 For the purpose
of this Article, I only sketch an outline of structural political liberalism in
order to provide the minimal foundation necessary to discuss the Court's
capital punishment doctrine in the context of the criminaljustice system of
a liberal society.'
Structural political liberalism describes and defends basic institutions
of political justice that provide a structure for a fair system of social
cooperation among individuals who endorse a variety of comprehensive
moral doctrines. Those who endorse various comprehensive moral
doctrines can differ with one another regarding a number of important
moral issues, principles, and obligations, yet converge on certain principles
ofpolitical morality such that they can support mutually compatible liberal
130. See WIL KYMUCKA, LIBERAUSM, COMUNrrY, AND CULTURE 9 (1989).
131. See ScHopp, supranote 78, § 3.3, at 64-75 (providingamore detailed discussion of this
normative stlructure).
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political institutions.' These institutions establish and protect public and
nonpublic domains ofjurisdiction. Citizens participate in and influence the
public domain through democratic political institutions that embody the
shared principles of political morality and protect the individual's
discretion to pursue a broad range of life plans within the nonpublic
domain.'
The rule of law is central to this political philosophy in that law in a
liberal society defines and protects the boundaries of the public and
nonpublic domains and regulates the conduct of individuals and of the
government in the public jurisdiction. Criminal law represents important
components of the societal standards of public morality by prohibiting
some types of conduct as wrongful and by establishing societal standards
of criminal responsibility that qualify persons as accountable participants
in the public jurisdiction. In this manner, the criminal law protects
individual standing by proscribing, preventing, and punishing culpable
actions by some citizens that violate the rights and interests of others."
When a liberal state enforces the core rules of the criminal law, it
maintains the public order and safety through deterrence and restraint, and
it vindicates the standing of the victim by punishing and condemning
criminal conduct that violates that person's rights or interests.
Criminal conviction and punishment for a specific offense condemns
the defendant as one who has violated the societal standards of public
morality represented by the criminal law under conditions of culpability by
systemic standards.1 35 This expression of condemnation is retributivist in
the sense that it condemns the offender as one who committed the crime
with the capacities required for culpability, and the severity of the
condemnation reflects the degree of culpability. This punishment and
condemnation reaffirms the standing of the defendant as one who qualifies
for equal standing in the public domain insofar as the requirements of
criminal responsibility limit criminal liability to those who violate the
criminal law while possessing the capacities necessary to direct their
conduct in compliance with a rule-based legal system through a process of
competent practical reasoning. This expression of condemnation in
proportion to culpability converges with the Court's discussion of
retribution and culpability in capital cases. 136 The emphasis the Court's

132. JOHN RAWLS, POLIrICALLIBERALISM §§ 1-3, at 4-22 (1996). Rawls refers to religious,
moral, or philosophical comprehensive doctrines. Id. § 1, at 10. I refer to all of these as moral

doctrines in order to include those systems or aspects of systems that people rely on to address
moral questions regarding how we ought to live.
133. Id. at § 6, at 38.
134. SCHOPP, supra note 78, § 3.3.2, at 71.
135. Id. § 2.3.1, at 22 (discussing the five types of condemnation).
136. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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opinions place on sentencing in accord with offender culpability reflects
the importance of the capacities needed to participate in the public
jurisdiction as a responsible subject of the criminal law. These capacities
enable the offender to act with the culpability that justifies the
condemnation inherent in criminal punishment generally and in capital
punishment specifically.
Authorizing the jury to sentence offenders by appeal to the community
conscience understood either as moral principles endorsed by the jury as
a sample of the community or as the informal social consensus as
understood by the jury would violate the fundamental boundary between
the public and nonpublic domains of a liberal society. It would do so by
subjecting the offender to sentencing according to standards regarding
which he had no notice and no opportunity to participate in establishing.
Furthermore, such a practice undermines the equal standing of citizens
under law in the public jurisdiction. By sentencing according to principles
or criteria other than those established as societal standards embodied in
law, sentencers subject individual offenders to standards that do not apply
to citizens generally, including the sentencers. That is, these sentencers
subject specific offenders to certain standards of capital sentencing, but
they do not subject themselves or others to those same standards because
those standards have no precedential force beyond the immediate case nor
are they explicitly articulated or recorded."3
The adverse affects of this departure from the rule of law that orders the
public jurisdiction extend beyond the offenders to the victims and to the
law itself. Insofar as the expressive function of criminal punishment
includes vindication of the law and of the standing of the victim,
sentencing according to informal social standards denigrates the law and
the standing of the victim. It denigrates the law by recognizing the
authority of unelected individuals or small groups to depart from or to vary
the interpretation of the law in particular situations. Sentencing according
to informal social standards denigrates the standing of victims because it
addresses violations of their interests and standing in the publicjurisdiction
through application of standards regarding which they had no notice and
no opportunity to participate in establishing. Furthermore, the sentencers
who apply these informal standards do not subject themselves or anyone
else to those standards. Thus, they deny victims the respect represented by
equal treatment under law.' This denial of equal respect constitutes the
core of the comparative injustice suggested by the data indicating that

137. SCHOPP, supra note 78, § 6.3.3, at 175.
138. Id. §§ 6.3.3-6.3.6, at 176-85.
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capital1 39
sentencing decisions in some jurisdictions differ by race of
victim.
In summary, the interpretation of "community values" as the societal
standards adopted by the society collectively in the form of law and the
principles of political morality underlying that body of law renders that
notion consistent with the interpretation of the first ambiguity as requiring
that the trial court admit and the sentencer consider all legally relevant
mitigating evidence. Furthermore, these two interpretations render
consistent the Supreme Court's requirements of guided discretion and
individualized assessment, the underlying principles of comparative and
noncomparative justice, and the relationship between the Court's capital
punishment cases and the principles of political morality underlying a
liberal society. Finally, these interpretations are consistent with allowing
mitigation in justice or in mercy, providing that sentencing law provides
guidelines for the systemic standards of justice or of mercy.
VII. TENSION INPRACTICE: THE INSTITUTIONAL STRuCTURE OF
CAPITAL SENTENCING
Although this interpretation of the relevant ambiguities renders the
doctrine and the underlying principles consistent in principle, it raises
serious questions regarding the ability of juries, and to a lesser extent the
abilities of trial judges, to fulfill the role of capital sentencer. Juries are not
well-suited for understanding the law at a level of complexity and
generality that would enable them to understand and apply the societal
standards represented by legal institutions. Empirical studies indicate that
jurors or jury-eligible individuals have difficulty understanding jury
instructions in general, those regarding capital punishment specifically, and
those regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances more
specifically."4 Thus, they encounter serious impediments to discharging
their responsibility to apply the directly relevant law.
139. BA.DUS ETAL, supra note 55, at 149-60; David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race
Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA'S
EXPERIMENT WrrH CAPTAL PUNISHMENT: REFIECrONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FtYrURE OF
THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCrION 385, 393-404 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter
AMERICA'S EXPO
WENT'WITH
CAPITAL PUNSHMEN].
140. WilliamL Bowers &Benjamin D. Steiner, ChoosingLife orDeath:SentencingDynamics
in CapitalCases,in AMERICA's EXPERMENTwrrHCAPrrALPUNISHmEr, supranote 139, at 309,

321-28 (indicating jurors' difficulty in understanding jury instruction in capital punishment cases
regarding aggravating and mitigating factors); Craig Haney, Mitigationandthe Study ofLives: On
the Roots of Violent CriminalityandtheNature ofCapitalJustice,in AMERICA'S EXPRIMENTWrfH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 139, at 351, 356-60 (indicating jurors' difficulty in
understanding jury instruction in capital punishment cases regarding aggravating and mitigating
factors). See generallyAMRAM ELWORKET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDETANDABLE
(1982) (indicating jurors' difficulty in understanding jury instructions generally).
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Insofar as societal standards are understood as referring to the
principles of political morality represented by the law of that jurisdiction,
concern regarding comprehension is significantly exacerbated. Few jurors
are familiar with the broader body of criminal law that provides the context
for interpreting these principles and applying them to sentencing, or with
the process of interpretation required by that task. Finally, jurors lack
access to information regarding the pattern of capital sentencing in the
jurisdiction, preventing them from making any serious effort to pursue
comparativejustice by sentencing a particular offender in a manner similar
to other offenders who are similarly culpable by systemic standards. Thus,
jurors frequently lack sufficient information, comprehension of specific
jury instructions, and the basis for deriving broad underlying principles that
represent societal values.
The same concerns apply, although to a lesser extent, to trial judges.
Although trial judges are better prepared than jurors to comprehend
sentencing standards specifically and the criminal law generally, most
criminal trial judges spend much of their time applying specific provisions
of the criminal law to specific offenses in the context of appellate court
rulings. Thus, trial judges ordinarily concentrate on the application of
specific provisions to particular factual situations rather than interpreting
the principles underlying an integrated body of law. Similarly, few trial
judges preside at a sufficient variety of capital trials to acquire familiarity
with the broad range of circumstances that characterize the offenses and
the offenders. Thus, they lack the comprehensive experience that would
facilitate comparative justice in sentencing.
At first glance, one might interpret these practical problems as good
reasons to seek alternative interpretations of the three ambiguities
discussed previously. Unfortunately, the alternative interpretations ofthese
ambiguities raise similarly serious concerns regarding implementation. To
the extent that jurors must make moral assessments, for the purpose of
sentencing, by applying community standards other than the societal
standards represented by law to the circumstances of the offense and the
character of the offender, they must do so on the basis of their own
personal moral standards or perhaps by applying what they understand to
be the widely shared informal moral standards in the limited and
nonrepresentative subset of their community with which they are familiar.
Whenjuries apply these informal community standards, they encounter the
difficulties previously discussed, and these generate the potential for
particularly troubling injustice in the context of capital sentencing.
Different juries hear each capital case. If these juries apply personal
moral standards or perceptions of the informal community consensus, these
standards or perceptions can reasonably be expected to overlap to some
degree, but they can also be expected to vary significantly across jurors and
juries. The empirical data suggest that juries and mock jurors tend to
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converge on verdicts in extreme cases and that discrimination by the race
of the victim is minimal. They tend to diverge regarding verdicts and
demonstrate more evidence of discrimination when presented with cases
with moderate degrees of aggravation and mitigation.1 41 This evidence
suggests that by assigning juries the responsibility to select sentences in
light of the informal community standards, the criminal justice system
would undermine the comparative justice ideal regarding cases with
moderate degrees of aggravation and mitigation. Sentencers apply
standards of culpability and desert that are sufficiently vague that they
enhance the risk of contamination by bias that can generate significantly
divergent decisions in these relatively close cases.
Although these differences may reflect deliberate discrimination in
some cases, the institutional structure within which sentencing juries must
function elicits inconsistency apart from deliberate bias. This inconsistency
can arise either because jurors have different conceptions of the applicable
standards or because they lack the ability to consistently apply common
standards across cases. Thus, juries can fulfill their responsibilities at the
relatively abstract level of conscientiously applying their personal moral
standards or their perceptions of informal community standards of
culpability yet fail to fulfill the comparative justice principle that calls for
similar treatment of similar cases and differential treatment of dissimilar
cases in a manner that reflects their morally relevant differences. These
factors can generate either arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing
disparities. In short, conscientious juries are likely to undermine the
comparativejustice principle in relatively close cases by applying different
personal moral standards, different interpretations of the informal moral
consensus, or both. In application, informal community values vary from

case to case.
Although variations across juries constitute departures from
comparative justice, they do not represent a conflict or tension between
comparative and noncomparative justice. Rather, they reflect the
inadequacy of capital sentencing by case-specific sentencers for both
comparative and noncomparative justice. Each responsible adult
participates in the public domain of a liberal society as a subject of the
legal and political institutions regarding which all have notice and an
opportunity to participate in developing. Insofar as sentencers apply
societal standards represented by law, they sentence offenders by the
principles and criteria that legitimately order the public domain of the
liberal society.142 Insofar as specific sentencers undermine comparative
justice by applying personal or informal community standards that vary
141.

BALDuS ErAL., supranote55, at 149-55,318-23;Baldus &Woodworth, supranote 139,

at 401.
142. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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across cases, at least some of these standards depart from the societal
standards embedded in law. In these cases, the sentencers depart from
noncomparative justice as well as from comparative justice because they
sentence offenders according to standards other than the societal standards
of retributive justice that legitimately order the public jurisdiction of a
liberal society. In short, when sentencers rely on personal or informal
community standards rather than on the societal standards embedded in
law, they undermine both comparative and noncomparative justice.
Furthermore, they violate the boundary between the public and nonpublic
domains of the liberal society. The central tension does not occur between
the comparative and noncomparative justice projects. Rather, it occurs
between both of these projects and an institutional practice that relies on
case-specific sentencers.

VII AN ALTERNATrVE SENTENCING STRuCrUE
Consider the possibility that a sentencing procedure relying on judicial
panels might bring certain advantages for the purpose of promoting
comparative and noncomparative justice. I do not purport to present a fully
developed proposal here. I sketch the outline of one such approach in order
to consider the potential relationships among alternative approaches to
sentencing, the current doctrinal "tension," and the underlying principles
of comparative and noncomparativejustice. By assigning the responsibility
for sentencing to a judicial panel, perhaps including the trial court judge
and two other criminal court judges selected from a pool of qualified
capital sentencing judges, a jurisdiction might promote the comparative
justice function in several ways. The jurisdiction could systematically
collect and analyze a broad range of information regarding relevant factors
such as aggravating and mitigating circumstances and regarding irrelevant
factors that might influence sentencing. Thejurisdiction could analyze that
data in order to identify correlations between capital sentences and those
relevant and irrelevant factors. In this manner the jurisdiction could build
a body of information regarding legitimate sentencing considerations in
order to promote consistency and regarding illegitimate sentencing
considerations in order to identify and correct distortions in the process.
A limited number of otherwise qualified judges could study this data
and participate in sentencing panels that serve as sentencers in capital trials
in the jurisdiction. By participating in a significant number of capital trials
and studying the data from all such trials, the members of this pool of
capital sentencing judges could become familiar with the circumstances
and verdicts in the range of capital trials that occur in the jurisdiction. The
panels could be required to write opinions articulating the aggravating and
mitigating factors that justify their decisions, identifying the evidence that
supports the findings that these factors apply, and explaining why these
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factors support the sentence given. Thus, they could gradually develop a
caselaw of sentencing that guides the decisionmaking of later panels and
promotes increased consistency over time.143
Finally, the members of the pool of qualified capital sentencing judges
could develop a broad understanding of the sentencing law governing the
jurisdiction in which they preside, enabling them to understand, articulate,
and apply the principles of political morality represented by that body of
law. The claim here is not that members of a judicial sentencing pool
would function as legal philosophers who develop a comprehensive
political theory of a particular legal system. 1" Rather, they would pursue
a more limited project in that they would develop a command of the law
relevant to capital sentencing in that jurisdiction that would allow them to
draw reasonable inferences about the principles of political morality
represented by that particular body of law and about the manner in which
these have been interpreted and applied in prior cases by trial and appellate
courts. As they articulate these principles in sentencing opinions, the
principles would become part of the recorded case law of capital
sentencing, promoting consistency of interpretation across pool members
and panels.
The emphasis on principles of sentencing reflects an important concern.
Justice Harlan may well have been correct when he contended in
4s that "[t]o identify before the fact those
McGautha v. California"
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for
the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which
can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to
be tasks which are beyond present human ability."" 6 Some commentators
contend that attempts to formulate aggravating and mitigating factors that
accommodate all such circumstances have produced capital sentencing
provisions that are so broad and vague as to provide no substantive limits
or guidance. 7 Arguably, this situation reflects the interaction of three

143. In the category of capital trials, I include all trials on charges that could result in a capital
sentence. Thus, the panels would write opinions explaining the bases for decisions to apply capital

punishment and for decisions to refrain from doing so. This case law of capital sentencing would
enable the pool members and others to articulate the grounds that differentiate capital offenders and
offenses that receive capital sentences and those that do not. One of many serious practical
questions regarding such an approach involves the level of stress it would generate for pool
members. In order to critically evaluate the force of practical concerns, one needs some clear
understanding of the justification (or lack thereof) for the institution in principle.
144. Contrast the role of Dworkin's Hercules in RONALD DWORKN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977).
145. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
146. Id.at204.
47. See, e.g., Kirchmeier, supra note 10, at 360-91; Steiker & Steikersupra note 10, at 371-
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factors: the attempt to articulate aggravating and mitigating circumstances
rather than principles; -the broad and unpredictable range of such
circumstances; and application by case-specific sentencers. The interaction
of the first two factors places legislatures in a dilemma. They can articulate
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in specific terms or in broad
general terms. If they take the former approach, the unpredictable
circumstances raised by some cases will generate intuitively unjust results.
Alternately, if they take the latter approach, they produce lists of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are broadly inclusive and
stated in general terms, rendering them susceptible to many interpretations.
Application of such provisions by case-specific sentencers renders it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop consistent sentencing.
Legislatures could articulate aggravating considerations in terms of
general principles of sentencing involving, for example, desert,
blameworthiness, culpability, capacities of accountability, risk, or others.
Aggravating and mitigating factors stated in this fashion could
accommodate the broad and unpredictable variety of circumstances
referred to by Justice Harlan in McGautha.When applied by case-specific
sentencers, however, they produce a problem with consistency in
interpretation similar to that produced by broad general descriptions of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The introduction of sentencing
pools and panels provides an opportunity to improve the level of
consistency in the interpretation and application of these principles through
the processes of data collection and analysis, written case law of
sentencing, and comparative analysis across cases by repeat sentencers.
Furthermore, the articulation and application of sentencing provisions
in terms of principles renders the sentencing process more consistent with
the normative framework provided by the criminal justice system in a
liberal society. Recall that variations in sentences across juries attempting
to apply community standards can occur at the relatively concrete level of
interpretation of circumstances or at the more abstract level of principle.1'
Either type of variation can generate inconsistency across cases, but
variation at the level of principle undermines the normative framework that
supports the legal institutions of a liberal society. The distinction between
the public and nonpublic domains is critical to a liberal society. Such a
society orders the public domain through legal institutions representing
principles and rules established through political processes in which all
competent adults have the opportunity to participate. 49 Inconsistency in
sentencing due to variations in the principles applied by different
sentencers violates the fundamental distinction between the public and

148. See supra Parts V.D., VI.A.
149. See supra Part VI.C.
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nonpublic domains and the equal standing of defendants, victims, and
survivors as subject only to the principles and rules established through the
political processes of the public domain.
Sentencing pools and panels provide the opportunity to improve
consistency regarding both circumstances and principles. The broad and
unpredictable range of circumstances that arise in different cases would
limit the degree of consistency realistically achievable regarding
circumstances. Consistency regarding the principles of sentencing applied
is the critical concern in a liberal society, however, and sentencing pools
and panels provide the opportunity to improve consistency in the
interpretation and application of principle through mechanisms such as
those described previously. Various alternative approaches using repeat
sentencers might have advantages or disadvantages as compared to the
pool and panel approach outlined here. I advance this approach only as an
example of a type of sentencing institution that might reasonably be
expected to improve convergence of sentencing practices with the
principles of comparative and noncomparative justice represented by the
guided discretion and individualized assessment doctrines as well as with
the broader principles of political morality underlying the legal institutions
of a liberal society.
The jury might continue to fulfill a substantive role in such a system.
First, the jury would retain its current function in rendering a verdict at the
guilt phase of capital trials. Second, insofar asjury participation is valuable
for the purpose of maintaining citizen monitoring and constraint of state
actors as those officials exercise lethal authority, a jurisdiction might
require jury determinations regarding certain factual matters. The guilt
phase jury could be authorized to hear the sentencing phase evidence and
arguments and make findings of fact regarding matters relevant to
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.150 Depending on the specific
questions at issue, for example, they might make findings that the
defendant committed the murder for pecuniary gain, that the victim
provoked the defendant, that the defendant suffers from mild mental
retardation, or other relevant factual findings.
A jurisdiction might authorize juries to make recommendations to the
judicial panel regarding nonspecified aggravating or mitigating
circumstances presented by the evidence. Thus, thejury might recommend
that the judicial panel consider, for example, the potential mitigating force
of the defendant's social disadvantages or the potential aggravating force
of the specific motives for this crime. The judicial panel would review
these findings and recommendations in the context of the available

150. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710-11 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to
traditional practices involving findings of facts regarding capital sentencing by juries).
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information regarding the sentencing decisions in other capital cases in the
jurisdiction and as informed by the panel's understanding of the principles
of capital sentencing and of the broader societal standards represented by
the law. The precise range of jury findings and recommendations
authorized would depend upon the principles of capital sentencing
articulated in the jurisdiction's capital sentencing provision and upon the
related responsibilities of the jury and of the judicial panel. The scope of
the jury's authority would not allow, for example, jury findings or
recommendations regarding matters
decided during the guilt phase or
5
requiring legal interpretation.1 '
No plausible approach to capital sentencing can produce complete
consistency while allowing consideration of a full array of circumstances
arising in capital cases. It seems reasonable to hypothesize, however, that
some system of the general type outlined here could gradually articulate
and apply with reasonable consistency the societal standards of retributive
justice applicable to capital sentencing. By explicitly articulating such
standards and applying them to the circumstances of each case, this process
would advance the function of the Court's individualized assessment
doctrine and promote noncomparative justice by systemic standards as
applied to each offender. By continuing this process and developing a more
explicit and comprehensive case law of capital sentencing, such a system
would advance the function of the Court's guided discretion doctrine and
promote comparative justice.
IX. CONCLUSION

I do not contend that this brief outline of one possible alternative
approach to capital sentencing represents a fully developed solution to the
search for comparative and noncomparative justice in capital sentencing.
Rather, I present this sketch in order to illustrate the importance of clearly
articulating the relationships among capital sentencing doctrine, applied
sentencing practices, and the principles of comparative and
noncomparativejustice embedded in the broader set of legal institutions in
which sentencing occurs. This process requires clarification and
justification of specific interpretations of the central ambiguities in the case
opinions and appeal to the principles of political morality embedded in the
legal system. It seems reasonable to contend, for example, that judicial
panels roughly of the type proposed could surpass juries or ordinary trial
judges in providing deeper and broader understanding of the societal
standards represented by the law. It also seems reasonable to expect that

151. 1 make no effort here to develop detailed parameters of jury fAct finding. A fully
articulated proposal would define a complimentary set of responsibilities forjudicial panels and for

juries.
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the extended practice of sentencing by such judicial panels could develop
an official record of judicial reasoning that could promote comparative
justice by increasing consistency in the interpretation and application of the
systemic principles and criteria of retributive justice applied across cases.
These advantages of capital sentencing by judicial panels occur within
the context of a conception of community standards as the societal
standards represented by the legal system. In contrast, there is no obvious
reason to believe that judicial panels would exceed juries in the ability to
accurately represent or perceive the informal social consensus or that such
panels would make more defensiblejudgments of personal morality. Thus,
the most defensible sentencing practices might vary across legal systems
in a manner that reflects differences in the principles of retributive justice
represented by the criminal law in those systems.
Recall the distinctions drawn in Part I among the moral justification of
capital punishment, doctrinal analysis, and problems of practical
application. This Article directly addresses a matter of doctrinal analysis
involving the purported contradiction or tension between guided discretion
and individualized assessment. I take no position here regarding the moral
justification (or lack thereof) for capital punishment or regarding the
myriad practical problems that arise in attempting to apply any institution
of capital punishment. The analysis advanced in this Article demonstrates,
however, that these three levels of analysis interact such that satisfactory
resolution of issues arising at any of these three levels can rest on
clarification of issues at the other levels. The resolution proposed here of
the purported contradiction or tension arising in Supreme Court doctrine,
for example, rests in part upon the premise that the justification of capital
punishment in a liberal society must address noncomparative and
comparative justice as defined by the principles of political morality
embedded in the legal institutions regulating the public jurisdiction of that
society. An institution of capital punishment that fulfills the requirements
of noncomparative and comparative justice by these standards qualifies as
justified by the conventional public morality of that society. Such
justification does not exhaust the moral inquiry, however, because the
conventional morality embedded in society's legal institutions remains
subject to critical moral evaluation.
Similarly, legal practices such as the alternative approach to capital
sentencing by judicial panels sketched in Part VfI must be evaluated in
terms of their effectiveness in applying the legal doctrine in a manner that
renders capital punishment in practice consistent with the principles of
political morality embedded in the legal system that orders the public
domain of that society. An analysis demonstrating that the conventional
principles of political morality justifying capital punishment in a particular
society required application of community standards in the form of the
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informal social consensus, for example, would undermine the argument
advanced here for sentencing by judicial panels.
In summary, a comprehensive justification of an institution of capital
punishment for a particular legal system would integrate three levels of
analysis. First, it would provide a systemic justification in that it would
interpret the relevant legal doctrine in a manner that rendered that doctrine
internally coherent and consistent with the broad principles of political
morality embedded in the larger legal system that orders the public domain
of that society. This Article represents an initial attempt to address this
level of analysis in that it advances an interpretation of the Court's
requirements of guided discretion and individualized assessment that
renders these components of legal doctrine internally coherent as well as
consistent with each other, with systemic principles of retributive justice,
with pursuit of comparative and noncomparative justice, and with the
principles of political morality underlying the legal institutions of a liberal
society. Second, a comprehensive justification would provide a critical
moral justification for capital punishment by appeal to defensible moral
principles. In order to comprehensively justify a particular institution of
capital punishment, this critical moral justification must cohere with the
principles of political morality embedded in the legal institutions of that
society such that an integration of the systemic and critical levels of
analysis would justify the institution of capital punishment by appeal to the
principles embedded in the legal system and to compatible principles of
critical morality. Third, the comprehensive analysis would defend the
practical application of capital punishment in a particular institutional
structure as 5 2consistent with the integrated systemic and critical
1

justification.

One significant component of the continuing debate regarding capital
punishment involves the failure to clearly distinguish these three levels of
dispute or the failure to clearly interpret and defend each in the context of
the relationships among the three. The judgment that the doctrines of
guided discretion and individualized assessment are irreconcilable reflects
the acceptance of the proffers formulation of the ambiguity regarding the
range of evidence the trial court must admit and the sentencer must
consider, and this interpretation reflects the failure to address the issue in
the context of the underlying principles of noncomparative and
comparative justice.'53 The Court's opinions provide no analysis
supporting this formulation. Indeed, they provide no evidence that -the

152. By identifying three levels of analysis, I do not suggest that these must be addressed
sequentially. Rather, the need for an integration of the three suggests a process of analysis that
addresses the levels separately and in combination.
153. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1152-59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Walton,
497 U.S. at 661-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Court recognized the ambiguity between the two formulations. The
analysis advanced in Part VI of this Article provides good reason to reject
the proffers formulation. This analysis rests partially upon the
interpretation of community values as societal standards and upon the
recognition that in order to carry justificatory force in the public
jurisdiction of a liberal society, those societal standards must pursue
noncomparative and comparative justice by appeal to the principles of
political morality embedded in law.
The analysis advanced here neither establishes nor undermines the
claim that capital punishment is justified in principle. Neither does it
establish or refute the claim that any particular institution of capital
punishment currently in place provides justifiable practices of capital
punishment. Rather, it demonstrates substantive and methodological points
about current doctrine. Substantively, it refutes the purported contradiction
or tension between the requirements of guided discretion and
individualized assessment. Methodologically, it demonstrates that
clarification of specific doctrine requires interpretation in context of
broader systemic standards, including the systemic principles and criteria
of retributive justice. These systemic standards are subject to further
evaluation regarding coherence with the broader political morality
embodied in that society's legal institutions and with critical moral
argument. A comprehensive justification of a particular institution of
capital punishment would integrate all three levels of analysis.
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